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RECREATIONAL RIGHTS TO THE DRY SAND 
BEACH IN FLORIDA:  
PROPERTY, CUSTOM AND CONTROVERSY 
 
Alyson Flournoy, Thomas T. Ankersen & Sasha Alvarenga1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
At the close of the 2018 legislative session Florida Governor Rick Scott 
signed HB 631 into law. The new law converted local dustups between 
beachgoers and beachfront landowners into a statewide sandstorm that 
pitted public rights to access to the dry sand beach against landowners’ 
private property rights. This article seeks to address the widespread 
confusion about the scope of and relationship between these respective 
rights and to rebut confused and exaggerated narratives about the 
impacts of the new law that have fueled further conflict. The resolution 
of these issues will have broad policy implications, with significant 
impact on recreational, property, dignity, economic, and conservation 
values.  Moreover, in an era of ongoing sea-level rise, the pressures on 
our coastal resources and the conflicts among these values will only 
increase.  The article begins by briefly describing the history of the 
current controversy and of the legal principle at the heart of the conflict: 
the doctrine of customary use of Florida’s beaches. After offering a 
detailed review of the Florida Supreme Court’s landmark case on the 
customary use doctrine along with subsequent lower court cases 
interpreting it, it identifies the legal issues that have created widespread 
confusion regarding the interplay among the common law property 
rights at issue, local ordinances that recognize and regulate those rights, 
and the recent state legislation now codified in Fla. Stat. §163.035 
(2019).  The article concludes by discussing some of the options 
available to the Florida legislature to resolve the controversy that HB 
631 engendered and to address related issues contributing to conflict at 
the water’s edge along the state’s coastline. 
 
 
1. Alyson C. Flournoy – Professor and Alumni Research Scholar, University of 
Florida Levin College of Law; Thomas T. Ankersen, Legal Skills Professor & 
Director, Conservation Clinic, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 
Legal Specialist, Florida Sea Grant; Sasha Alvarenga, J.D. Candidate & Student 
Associate, Conservation Clinic, University of Florida Levin College of Law.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the close of the 2018 legislative session Florida Governor 
Rick Scott signed HB 631 into law. Included in the bill, which 
addressed a number of issues relating to actions for ejectment from 
real property, was an amendment to the Florida Community 
Planning Act entitled “Establishment of Recreational Customary 
Use.” The new statute immediately created a sandstorm of 
controversy as the media seized on what many in the public 
perceived to be a land grab over the public’s right to recreate on 
Florida’s sandy beaches.2  As it turns out, the story is considerably 
more nuanced, and neither the advocates on both sides nor the media 
did the public any favors in the commentary and reporting on this 
issue. However, both the background to the legislation and 
subsequent events indicate that the public is rightly concerned about 
efforts to limit recreational access, some of which have been spurred 
or exacerbated by what had been a largely localized controversy. 
 
This paper begins by briefly describing the history of the current 
controversy, which had its origins in Walton County, Florida. The 
conflict centers on arguments about the public’s right to use the dry 
sand beach — that area of the beach that is between the line of 
vegetation and the mean high tide line — which is often privately 
owned.  We then discuss the broader legal context that gives rise to 
boundary disputes along dynamic shorelines and provide the 
essential policy-relevant facts concerning public and private sandy 
beach ownership.  In order to fully understand the legal basis for the 
public’s claim of right to use the sandy beaches and the legislative 
response, we summarize the history of the relevant legal doctrine 
 
2. Craig Pittman, New law Scott signed makes public access to beaches harder 
to establish, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/New-law-Scott-signed-makes-
public-access-to-beaches-harder-to-establish_167015546 
[https://perma.cc/NR2U-BY3M].; Travis Cohen, Rick Scott Just Signed a Bill 
That Could Make Many of Florida's Beaches Private, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr. 
4, 2018), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/rick-scott-just-signed-a-bill-
that-could-make-many-of-floridas-beaches-private-10231813 
[https://perma.cc/2YH7-NW6U].; John Kennedy, Beach lovers push back on 
new property rights law, HERALD TRIBUNE (Apr. 14, 2018), 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180414/beach-lovers-push-back-on-new-
property-rights-law [https://perma.cc/KF6K-NQWB]. 
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known as customary use that came over from England during the 
post-colonial era and made its way into the law of a number of states, 
including Florida.  We offer a detailed review of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s landmark case on the customary use doctrine along 
with subsequent lower court cases interpreting it.  We then attempt 
to identify the legal issues that have created widespread confusion 
regarding the interplay among the common law property rights at 
issue, local ordinances that recognize and regulate those rights, and 
particularly, the state legislation that precipitated the widespread 
attention to and conflict over this issue (em dash)  HB 631, now 
codified in Fla. Stat. §163.035 (2019).  After flagging several legal 
issues at the heart of the conflict, we provide an annotated summary 
of the statute that describes the interpretive issues it raises or may 
raise.  We conclude by discussing some of the options available to 
the Florida legislature to resolve the sandstorm of controversy that 
HB 631 engendered. 
 
A. A Sandstorm of Controversy 
 
HB 631 has its origins in Walton County, Florida, where 
long simmering disputes between the beach-loving public and some 
privacy-loving beachfront property owners erupted into litigation in 
2016.  The litigation was precipitated by the County’s efforts to 
mediate the ongoing conflict by passing a “customary use” 
ordinance. Landowners were seeking to enforce trespass laws 
against public beachgoers continuing the longstanding practice of 
using the landowners’ privately-owned beach. The County sought 
to mediate through legislative action — adoption of an ordinance — 
the conflict over the extent of the public’s right to use the dry sand 
beach.  At issue was the right of the public to venture onto and along 
what is known as the “dry sand beach” — that part of the sandy 
beach that is above mean high tide, and hence, if not publicly owned, 
likely to be private property. Relying on an ancient legal doctrine 
referred to as “customary use,” and a 1974 ruling by the Florida 
Supreme Court recognizing that doctrine,3 Walton County sought to 
clarify and recognize the public’s right to reasonable use of the dry 
sand beach within its jurisdiction, while including regulatory 
 
3. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974). 
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safeguards to protect beachfront property owners. The ordinance 
reflected the County’s legislative determination, based on extensive 
fact research and analysis of the relevant law, that the public had 
customary use rights in the dry sand beach throughout Walton 
County.  At its core, customary use doctrine holds that where the 
public has traditionally and continuously used the dry sand beach 
since “time immemorial” it may continue to do so, even though the 
property remains in private ownership.4 
 
Walton County’s 2017 ordinance sought to recognize and 
protect, but also to regulate customary use rights, thereby providing 
landowners some privacy and imposing what the County believed 
to be reasonable limitations on the uses which the public could make 
of the beach. The ordinance contained three key provisions. First, it 
established a zone of fifteen feet “seaward from the toe of the dune 
or from any permanent habitable structure owned by a private 
entity” (whichever is more seaward) and prohibited the public at 
large from using this buffer zone, except as needed to utilize an 
authorized public beach access point.5 This provision provided a 
zone of privacy for private landowners who owned the dry sand 
beach.  Second, it prohibited interference with the right of the public 
at large to engage in designated activities on the remainder of the 
privately-owned dry sand beach.6  Finally, it limited the nature and 
scale of the activities the public could engage in on the dry sand 
beach.  The ordinance specifically prohibited use of tobacco, 
possession of animals, and erection or use of tents.7 It explicitly 
authorized the following exclusive list of activities: traversing the 
beach; sitting on the sand, a beach chair, a towel or blanket; using a 
beach umbrella seven feet or less in diameter; placement of surfing 
or fishing equipment; sunbathing; picnicking; fishing; swimming or 
surfing off the beach; and building sand creations.8 
 
 
4. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935 at 623 (3d 
ed. 1939). 
5. WALTON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2(c) (2017). 
6. Id. at § 23-2(a). 
7. Id. at § 23-2(e). 
8. Id. at § 23-2(d). 
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As with any ordinance, Walton County followed its usual 
notice and hearing process prior to adopting the customary use 
ordinance.  Various landowners who sought to challenge the 
ordinance filed at least seven different lawsuits against Walton 
County in 2016 and 2017, challenging the ordinance and a related 
ordinance limiting signs and obstructions on the beach. The 
plaintiffs variously claimed the ordinances were ultra vires, void for 
vagueness, and a violation of their rights under the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as imposing 
unconstitutional conditions.9  The claims in the various lawsuits 
filed after the ordinance’s passage encompassed both objections to 
the substance of the ordinance (the validation of customary use 
rights) and to the process (use of an ordinance to codify these rights).  
Some Walton County landowners’ hostility to the ordinance fueled 
legislative intervention that ended up producing HB 631.  
 
All but one of the claims related to Walton County’s 
ordinance10  were dismissed without prejudice as unripe or moot or 
were voluntarily dismissed.11   
 
9. Goodwin v. Walton Cnty. No. 3:16-cv-364/MCR/CJK (N.D. Fla. First 
Amended Complaint filed Nov. 7, 2016)(1st Amendment and taking without just 
compensation claims); Rosemary Beach v. Walton Cnty., No. 2016-CA-000594 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2016)(ultra vires and due process claims); A 
Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cnty, No. 3-17-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. 
filed May 11, 2017)(taking without just compensation and taking without due 
process claims); Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:17-cv-00682-
MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Second Amended Complaint filed Oct. 2, 2017) (estoppel, 
waiver, consent and acquiescence, substantive due process, procedural due 
process, separation of powers, taking without just compensation, equal 
protection, unconstitutional conditions, Fourth Amendment, and void for 
vagueness claims). 
10. This was a claim related to abandonment of an access easement in A Flock 
of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cty, No. 3-17-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. filed 
May 11, 2017). 
11. Most of these claims weres dismissed as moot or voluntarily after the 
adoption of HB 631invalidated the Walton County ordinance. Rosemary Beach 
v. Walton Cnty., No. 2016-CA-000594 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. March 28, 2018) 
(Notice of voluntary dismissal); A Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton Cnty, No. 3-
17-cv-0033-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. May 5, 2018); Stipulation for dismissal of 
taking and due process claims); Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cnty. No. 
3:17-cv-00682-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2018) (Order denying summary 
judgment and dismissing all claims as moot). The as applied takings challenge 
in Goodwin v. Walton County was dismissed as unripe. No. 3:16-cv-
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In the midst of the Walton County litigation, the Florida 
legislature passed, and the Governor signed HB 631, effectively 
preempting all but two counties with preexisting Customary Use 
ordinances—Volusia and St. Johns—f rom adopting or maintaining 
similar ordinances by any process other than a new process 
described in the Bill.  Although landowners seeking legislative 
action may also have wanted to substantively curtail customary use 
rights, the legislation that ultimately passed in 2018 did not affect 
any substantive change in common law customary use rights, as is 
explained in more detail below. One clear and intended impact of 
the Bill was to invalidate the Walton County ordinance. This in turn 
mooted the remaining claims in most of the pending litigation.  The 
sponsors of the Bill expressed the hope that this reset would 
eliminate or at least reduce the level of conflict and litigation in 
Walton County and elsewhere.12 However, as is detailed below, the 
new law certainly did not end and arguably intensified the conflict. 
At least one bill was filed in the Senate for the 2019 legislative 
session that would have repealed HB 631 but it did not advance.13 
 
A last-minute floor amendment to HB 631 injected 
uncertainty into the preemptive intent of the statute: it allows local 
governments to raise customary use as an affirmative defense in any 
proceeding challenging an ordinance enacted prior to the new law’s 
effective date of July 1, 2018.  This arguably created a window after 
the Bill’s signing by the Governor and before its effective date in 
which any ordinances adopted by local governments would be 
exempt from the new procedure because, when challenged, these 
ordinances could nevertheless be defended based on customary 
 
364/MCR/CJK  (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2018)(Order dismissing 1st Amendment 
claim as moot and as applied takings claim as unripe). 
12. Shelby Danielsen, Debate Heats Up Over Public Beach Access Along 
Private Property in Florida, FIRST COAST ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/beaches/debate-heats-up-
over-public-beach-access-along-private-property-in-florida/77-507298799 
[https://perma.cc/2TYD-4274]. 
13. News Service of Fla., Beach Access Law Gets Challenged, Rouson Files 
Repeal Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018) 
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/11/21/beach-access-law-
gets-challenged-rouson-files-repeal-bill/. 
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use.14  However, the new law prohibited local governments from 
“keeping in effect”—as well as adopting—ordinances finding, 
determining, relying on or based upon customary use of the dry sand 
beach, unless they are enacted pursuant to the new process.15 This 
inconsistency created uncertainty and an arguable basis for local 
government action during the window before July 1, 2018. A 
number of counties and municipalities took advantage of this 
window to enact new ordinances.16   
 
B. Underlying Currents of Conflict 
 
There are several factors that have brought questions 
concerning the scope of the public’s use rights to the fore and made 
public use a contentious issue.  Some of these are social, cultural, 
and economic. But some of the undercurrents are legal. 
 
First, many landowners don’t understand that their title to 
beachfront land may be subject to customary use rights of the public.  
Some mistakenly think that beach ownership necessarily means an 
absolute right to exclude others. The right to exclude is an important 
attribute of property ownership, often viewed as one of the most 
important “sticks in the bundle” of property rights,17 but it is not 
absolute.  Land ownership has always been subject to various 
limitations, both regulatory and property-law based.  As the late 
Justice Scalia noted in his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina 
 
14. FLA. STAT. §163.035(4). F. S. JOUR. 689, 770 (Reg. Session 2018) 
(amendment 1 to Fla. CS for HB 631 (2018)) [https://perma.cc/QVT2-87YE].  
15. FLA. STAT. §163.035(2). 
16. NAPLES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 42, art. II, div. V (2018); 
FERNANDINA BEACH, FLA. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 90, art. II, div. 3 (2018); 
VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 20 art. III (2018); WALTON 
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2 (2018); Flagler County Board of 
County Commissioners, Public Hearing on Consideration of an Ordinance 
Recognizing the Right of Customary Use of the Beach by the Public (June 18, 
2018); Indian Rocks Beach Special City Commission Meeting on Ordinance No. 
2018-3 Customary Use of the Beach (June 28, 2018); Nassau County Board of 
County Commissioners, Agenda on the Adoption of Ordinance on Customary 
Use of Beach by the Public (June 25, 2018). 
17. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998), 
available at https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol77/iss4/7 
[https://perma.cc/X472-58PE]. 
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Coastal Commission, landowners' property rights are subject to so-
called "background principles" of property law. 18  These 
background principles typically derive from the common law as it 
has evolved over time in the various states. And in the case of 
privately-owned dry sand beach in Florida, customary use rights, 
prescriptive easements, purpresture, and implied dedication, are 
among the inherent limitations that comprise the background 
principles that may create exceptions to the right to exclude.   
 
Second, property at the ocean edge has other unique 
challenges. For beachfront property, the seaward boundary is what 
is called an ambulatory boundary—in other words, unlike a 
traditional surveyed property line fixed on a map, the boundary can, 
and does move.19  Beachfront owners may think that there is a fixed 
line that determines where their property ends, but this is not always 
the case. There is a line in the sand, but it’s one that can move in 
either direction over time. This is because the mean high tide is 
determined based on the average of 18.6 years of high tides.20  So 
locating the mean high tide line is not as easy as looking at where 
the sand is wet on a given day, as many beachgoers, property 
owners, and even some law enforcement officers assume.21   
Changes that occur to the land sea interface as a result of slow 
changes over time (erosion & accretion) can cause the boundary 
between public and private land to move and deviate from the mean 
high tide line.22 As a result, it is all but impossible for one walking 
the beach collecting sea shells to know for sure on which side of a 
property line she is walking.  Similarly, even for the landowner, 
tracing the contours of this boundary is likely to present significant 
challenges and may entail periodic modification. Erecting 
structures, fences, signs or other traditional signals of ownership is 
a fraught exercise on a high energy beach.   
 
18. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
19. Alyson C. Flournoy, Beach Law Cleanup: How Sea-level Rise Has Eroded 
the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework, 42 VT. L. REV. 89, 100–05 (2017). 
20. Id. at 101. 
21. See e.g., Tom McLaughlin, Duo test limits of beach access, governor’s 
order, enforcement, WALTON SUN (Jul. 16, 2018), 
http://www.waltonsun.com/news/20180716/duo-test-limits-of-beach-access-
governors-order-enforcement [https://perma.cc/8HJF-DXST]. 
22. See Flournoy, supra note 18. 
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So, landowners who attempt to demarcate their sandy beach 
as private and off limits to the public, may be wrong on two counts 
in any given case.  First, even if that part of the beach is privately 
owned, the public may have customary use rights.  Second, if the 
mean high tide line has migrated, what was once their property may 
no longer be.  And even to understand what areas of the dry sand 
beach are private or public in the first place requires greater 
understanding of the sand on the beach, where it came from, when, 
and how.  
 
II. SAND FACTS 
 
The reach of HB 631 is limited to dry sand beach that is held 
in private ownership, a significant fraction of Florida’s 825 miles of 
sandy beach.23 However, there is already considerable publicly 
owned dry sand beach, the result of federal, state, and local 
government ownership for public use as coastal parks or other 
protected areas, as well as for non-public or limited public use, such 
as military and civil works installations.  While the data is difficult 
to come by, one “back of the envelope” estimate based on publicly 
available geospatial data has put the amount of beach already in 
public ownership as parks, protected areas, and other government 
lands, at close to 50% of 825 miles of sandy beaches.24   
 
Florida’s dry sand beaches may also become partially public 
as a result of the operation of the state beach management program.25 
Of the approximately 825 miles of sandy beach, more than 229 miles 
are scheduled to be nourished or re-nourished with new sand in order 
 
23. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRATEGIC BEACH MANAGEMENT PLAN: 
INTRODUCTION 1 (2018), https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/SBMP-
Introduction_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC5-HKWB]. 
24. The authors were unable to locate an official calculation or estimate of the 
number of linear miles of privately-owned sandy beach in Florida. Determining 
what property deeds along Florida’s entire coastline extend to the mean high-
water line (MHWL) is a labor-intensive, fact specific determination. Kranz 
generally cites to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection for the 
proposition that sixty percent of Florida beaches are in public ownership. Erika 
Kranz, Sand for the People: The Continuing Controversy Over Public Access to 
Florida’s Beaches, 83 FLA. BAR J. 10, n. 8 (2009). 
25. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 2323, at 14. 
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to forestall erosion.26 To be eligible for nourishment these beaches 
must first have been declared “critically eroded” by the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection.27  The 2017 update to the 
State’s Critical Erosion Report indicates that 420.9 miles of 
Florida’s sandy beaches are critically eroded, and another 92.2 miles 
are “eroded.”28  Hurricane Irma-induced erosion in 2017 meant that 
for the first time more than 50% of Florida’s beaches were critically 
eroded, and hence eligible for beach management.29 The data from 
Florida’s most recent storm, Hurricane Michael, has not been tallied.    
 
Nourishment – the placement of additional sand on the beach 
seaward of the mean high tide line – pushes back the tide and resets 
the erosion clock. When a beach is nourished using federal or state 
dollars, the newly emergent dry sand beach—created from the 
submerged lands seaward of the mean high tide line and typically 
owned by the State of Florida – remains in state ownership up to the 
former mean high tide line, which is now  a line in the dry sand, and 
is re-designated the “erosion control line (ECL).”30  The beach 
landward of the ECL remains privately owned if it previously was 
 
26. Id. at 15. 
27.Id. “Critically eroded shoreline” is defined in subsection 62B-36.002(5), 
F.A.C., as “a segment of the shoreline where natural processes or human activity 
have caused, or contributed to, erosion and recession of the beach or dune 
system to such a degree that upland development, recreational interests, wildlife 
habitat or important cultural resources are threatened or lost. Critically eroded 
shoreline may also include adjacent segments or gaps between identified critical 
erosion areas which, although they may be stable or slightly erosional now, their 
inclusion is necessary for continuity of management of the coastal system or for 
the design integrity of adjacent beach management projects.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE 
ANN. r. 62B-36.002(5) (2013). 
28. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CRITICALLY ERODED BEACHES IN FLORIDA 5 
(Dec. 2017), 
https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/CriticalErosionReport_0.pdf. 
29. The Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines at Western Carolina 
University maintains a state by state interactive website that tracks beach 
nourishment projects. Office for Coastal Mgmt. Digital Coast, BEACH 
NOURISHMENT VIEWER,  http://beachnourishment.wcu.edu/ (“[T]he PSDS beach 
nourishment database contains attribute information on the general location of 
sand placement, primary funding source and funding type, volume of sediment 
emplacement (in cubic yards), length of beach nourished (in feet) and cost and 
inflated cost for 2,000 identified beach nourishment episodes dating back to 
1923.”). 
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.141, 161.151(3) (2018). 
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so, while the new beach, which has been created through the 
addition of sand, remains in public ownership.  While the private 
property owner retains riparian rights over the newly created public 
beach,31 the public owns and has the right to use the newly emergent 
dry sand beach.  This bifurcation of dry sand beach ownership 
remains until such time as the ocean or Gulf erodes the nourished 
public beach back to the ECL (the former Mean High Tide Line).32  
Once that occurs, there is no longer a publicly owned dry sand 
beach, and the common law boundary is reinstated. 
 
To date, new publicly owned dry sand beach has been 
created along more than 229 miles of Florida's coastline, under an 
increasingly robust – and increasingly necessary—beach 
management program.  Indeed, beach nourishment is one of the 
ways that funds can be spent under Florida’s constitutionally 
enshrined land acquisition program.  Federal cost-share represents a 
significant percentage of the funding for beach nourishment.33 
Moreover, once a beach has been nourished, it is eligible to be 
nourished at regular intervals.34  While some of these nourished 
beach miles are already in public ownership as parks and protected 
areas, most are not, simply because a key impetus for nourishment 
– the protection of upland structures – does not obtain.  As a result, 
a conservative assessment would suggest that the dry sand beach on 
more than half of Florida’s beaches may be completely or partially 
open to public use based on public ownership or ongoing 
nourishment.35  Of course, being open to public use does not 
 
31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 710 (2010). 
32. FLA. STAT. §161.211(2) (2018). 
33.“There are 25 federally authorized projects addressing 134.4 miles of 
shoreline. Florida has the largest federal shore protection program in the nation. 
Total Florida federal obligations to date for FY 1980-2016 are $1,155,000,000. 
The federal funding obligation for Florida shore protection projects is projected 
to be $1.3 billion over the next 20-year period (total cost $2.2B, remainder non-
federal share).” Beaches 2017 & Beyond, A Funding Initiative for Statewide 
Beach Management, FLA. SHORE & BEACH PRESERVATION ASS’N (Oct. 3, 
2016), https://www.fsbpa.com/Beaches2017.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8D3M-
G9WN]  
34. Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) 33 U.S.C. § 2213(d)(2) (2007); 
33 C.F.R. § 263.26(b) (2018). 
35. See supra note 23 & acc. text.   
2020] Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach 13 
 
necessarily mean that it is easily accessible.  For example, many 
areas lack facilities for parking or easy public transit access, thus, as 
a practical matter, limiting the use to those who live or are staying 
in the immediate vicinity. 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that, even in the face of 
ongoing sea level rise, not all of Florida’s beaches are eroding.  All 
coastal dynamics are local and there are beaches that are stable or 
accreting. Beyond any natural accretion that may occur due to 
geomorphological variation, sand accretes behind structures, 
especially inlet jetties; and sand from nourished beaches inevitably 
drifts beyond the project footprint, adding sand to unnourished 
beaches.36 These processes do not directly affect the underlying 
substantive property relationships, and the growing dry sand beach 
may all become privately owned, though it may still be subject to 
the use rights that are the subject of this paper.    
 
III. CUSTOMARY USE DOCTRINE 
 
A. Origins and Theory 
 
The notion of custom as a normative source of law extends 
across legal systems and is also recognized in international law.37  In 
the context of American property law, scholars and courts trace 
customary use to the English common law, dating back to medieval 
times when courts and communities found the law through social 
norms that emerged over time.38  Customary use is often lumped 
with other common law property doctrines that seek to order the 
relations between bona fide owners of particularized property and 
others who have made use of that property to such an extent that 
new property relations develop between them.  In essence, one or 
more of the “bundle of sticks” that constitute the right to property 
 
36. Jim Houston & Bob Dean, Erosional Impacts of Modified Inlets on the East 
Coast of Florida (Beach Encroachment and Nourishment), 
https://www.fsbpa.com/2016TechPresentations/Houston.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/58GD-LUEV]. 
37. See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 47–50 (1971).  
38. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 
307–09 (5th ed. 1956).  
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has been either transferred or diminished.  In this taxonomy, that 
stick is most commonly the right to exclude others.39   
 
Most well-known among these doctrines are adverse 
possession and prescription, followed by implied dedication and 
custom.  All have been imported into U.S. jurisprudence from 
English common law and modified to varying extents upon arrival.  
Adverse possession recognizes that one can occupy another’s 
property for so long and under such conditions that it makes no sense 
to retain the absent owner’s actual ownership.  In such cases, a new 
title can arise in the non-owning user, and the original owner is 
divested.  A variation on this accounts for those circumstances 
where a trespassory use is made of private property by a user, or 
users other than the owner, to such an extent that the owner’s right 
to exclude must give way to the trespasser. This is referred to as the 
creation of a “prescriptive easement,” and is most often associated 
with footpaths and roadways.  As with adverse possession, once the 
easement is perfected a new interest in the property arises and the 
owner’s rights are diminished.   
  
Both adverse possession and easement by prescription have 
been recognized by the courts and/or codified in the law of many 
states with distinct requirements that must be proved.40  Key among 
these is the requirement that the use must be ‘adverse’ to the 
property owner.  This element is often missing in cases where 
owners have invited, tolerated, or just ignored use of their property 
by others, without their permission.  However, where adversity is 
absent, a user may still gain rights under the doctrines of implied 
dedication and custom.41 Implied dedication occurs where a 
landowner demonstrates an intent to surrender his or her land for use 
 
39. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730 (1998). 
40. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (2018) (codifying and modifying the common 
law doctrine of adverse possession). The leading case on adverse possession and 
prescription in Florida continues to be Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (1958).  
41. Sheryl Strauss & Emily Wallace-Jackson, Property Law—Common Law 
Dedication: A Landowner's Intent to Dedicate—Security Federal Savings & 
Loan Association v. C & C Investments, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 373, 373 (1991). 
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by the public, and the public demonstrates acceptance of that use.42   
Custom, the subject of this discussion concerning sandy beaches, 
entails its own unique requirements discussed further below. 
 
Courts applying the common law have found that the 
customary use doctrine is well-suited to circumstances where 
adversity could not be easily proved, the geographic reach extends 
beyond an individual parcel and the use is made by an “unorganized 
public,” and have found no circumstance more appropriate than in 
the use of the sandy beach.  In the case of customary use, neither 
title nor an easement arises in another interest holder.  Instead, a 
right of use is conferred, a right which is limited to the custom being 
observed.  There are a number of early cases where custom has been 
applied to resolve disputes over otherwise trespassory communal 
uses of private property.  However, beachfront property appears to 
be the only instance where the doctrine has recently been applied in 
the United States. 
 
1.  Customary Use in England 
The notion of customary use of property arose in feudal 
English land law as a means to recognize longstanding use of the 
property of another (often the feudal lord who held domain over a 
manor comprised of vast tracts of land)  by a community of persons 
(often the subjects of the manor who lived and worked on the land) 
who were accustomed to conducting their use for specific purposes 
since “time immemorial,” which was also described as “until the 
memory of man runneth not,” or “time out of mind.”43  In England 
 
42. Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65, 71 (1975) (finding an 
implied dedication of the dry sand beach). 
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 
(1765).   
A good discussion of the English origins of the law of customary use can be 
found in: David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach 
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); see also Hope M. 
Babcock, Has The U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained The Swamp Of Takings 
Jurisprudence?: The Impact Of  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council On 
Wetlands And Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Carol 
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).  
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this apparently required continuity of use back at least to the times 
preceding the Coronation of Richard I on September 3, 1189 – a 
concept referred to as “legal memory.” However, even in England 
more practical approaches were the norm.  One scholar of the history 
of the common law asserts that the length of time for custom to ripen 
into law was and should be substantially shorter.44  
English law also suggests that custom was meant to be 
applied to geographically distinct areas such as counties, cities, 
towns, and manors, and not to the whole of England, and for the 
benefit of a community of people rather than individuals.45   Most 
early English custom cases addressed the customary use of property 
for productive, but non-extractive, purposes such as water access, 
storing seaweed, net-drying, etc.  However, over time, these sorts of 
utilitarian uses faded, and the doctrine began to be asserted to 
support more contemporary routinized community rituals such as 
playing cricket and dancing around the maypole, foreshadowing the 
recreational use to which it is now almost exclusively applied in the 
United States. 
 
44. Id. “In modern times we hear a lot too much of the phrase ‘immemorial 
custom.’ In so far as this phrase implies that custom is or ought to be 
immemorially old it is historically inaccurate.  In an age when custom was an 
active living factor in the development of society, there was much less insistence 
on actual or fictitious antiquity.” PLUCKNETT, supra note 32 at 342–43. 
45. According to Blackstone:  
And, first, the distinction between custom and prescription is this: that custom is 
properly a local usage, and not annexed to any person; such as a custom in the 
manor of Dale that lands shall descend to the youngest son; prescription is 
merely a personal usage; as, that Sempronius, and his ancestors, or those whose 
estate he hath, have used time out of mind to have such an advantage or 
privilege. As for example; if there be a usage in the parish of Dale, that all the 
inhabitants of that parish may dance on a certain close at all times, for their 
recreation (which is held to be a lawful usage); this is strictly a custom, for it is 
applied to the place in general, and not to any particular persons; but if the 
tenant, who is seised of the manor of Dale in fee, alleges that he and his 
ancestors, or all those whose estate he hath in the said manor, have used time out 
of mind to have common of pasture in such a close, this is properly called a 
prescription; for this is a usage annexed to the person of the owner of this estate. 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 263–64 
(1893). 
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Relying on English commentator William Blackstone, who 
has enjoyed tremendous, if sometimes criticized, influence as a 
chronicler of the common law in the United States, American 
commentators have broken down the proof required for customary 
use into a series of discrete elements, some of which courts have 
lumped together, due to their potential redundancy or overlap.  The 
general formulation of the doctrine that has emerged is that the right 
to use by custom cannot be acquired unless it is proved that the use: 
1) has continued from time immemorial 2) without interruption 3) 
and as of right; 4) is certain as to the place 5) and as to the persons; 
and 6) is certain and reasonable as to the subject matter or rights 
created.46  
2.  Customary Use in the United States 
 
The customary use doctrine clearly made its way across the 
Atlantic and into the common law of the states of the United States, 
albeit unevenly.  Early recognition can be found in Maine,47 
Massachusetts,48 and New Hampshire; 49  however, Maine has 
subsequently given conflicting signals regarding the doctrine’s 
viability.50  Rejection can be found in Connecticut (1905),51 New 
 
46. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935 at 623 (3d 
ed. 1939); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 75–78 (1893) (explaining the elements of custom). 
47. Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (Me. 1861) (noting customary use rights as a 
potential basis for a claim for an easement but not available in circumstances 
like those presented which involved collection of a profit⎯seaweed). 
48. Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 504 (Mass. 1829). 
49. Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (N.H. 1845) (recognizing a right of passage, but 
denying defendants’ claim which was based on a customary right to collect a 
profit -- seaweed); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (N.H. 1851). (recognizing a 
customary right to deposit seaweed collected from the ocean on private land). 
50. Compare Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 12, 34 (1984) 
(expressly rejecting doctrine of custom and noting that Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine had never recognized an easement by custom as a viable cause of 
action), with Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (appearing to 
recognize the existence of custom as a possible claim but upholding lower 
court’s finding of lack of evidence to support Town’s claim). In addition, the 
legislature seems to recognize the possibility that claims based on custom exist 
in ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 812 and 812A (2018). 
51. Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130 (Conn. 1905). 
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York (1935),52 and New Jersey (1825).53   The rationale for rejection  
generally centered on the irrelevance of a feudal doctrine to a 
modern nation, the impossibility of envisioning a “time 
immemorial” in a young country such as the U.S., and concern over 
the introduction of uncertainty into a relatively well-formed system 
of land titling and registration. 54 A non-coastal outlier, Idaho, 
confirmed the doctrine’s existence in that state in 1979, but refused 
to apply it.55  Finally, there are the states (or territories) where the 
doctrine has been recognized explicitly in the context of the 
contemporary dilemma of public recreational beach access: Oregon 
(1969),56 Florida (1974),57 Hawaii,58 North Carolina,59 Texas,60 and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands.61  These are discussed more fully below. 
 
Thus, if one were keeping count, the score would appear to 
be at least ten jurisdictions that have embraced or at least recognized 
customary use as an aspect of their common law, and at least three 
that have rejected it.62 Interestingly, nearly all these cases involved 
disputes centering on access to and along water bodies.   
 
 
52. Gillies v. Oriental Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675 (N.Y. 1935).  
53. Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125 (N.J. 1825); Matthews v. Bay Head 
Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (N.J. 1984). 
54. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.11[6]. 
55. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979). 
56. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969); Stevens v. City 
of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454–55 (Or. 1993). 
57. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). 
58. Public Access Shoreline v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 
1255–56 (Haw. 1995); Laura C. Harris, Case Note, Public Access Shoreline 
Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Commission: Expanding Hawaii's Doctrine 
Of Custom, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 293 (1997). 
59. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); appeal 
dismissed 793 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. 2016); cert. denied 138 S.Ct. 75 (2017). 
60. Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
61. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772–73 
(D.V.I. 1974). 
62. We limited our research to coastal states and did not exhaustively survey the 
law of inland states to determine whether the doctrine had been addressed in 
those states, for example in the riverine context.  None of the secondary 
literature on customary use that we consulted referenced states other than those 
described above. As is noted infra, note 62, some of the states that have declined 
to adopt customary use have instead relied on other doctrines like the public 
trust to achieve a similar outcome. 
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3.  The Modern Customary Use Cases and Recreational Beach 
Access 
 
As noted above, five states and the Territory of the Virgin 
Islands have explicitly recognized customary use as the basis for 
resolving recreational beach access conflicts: Oregon, Hawaii, 
North Carolina, Texas, and Florida. Others, like New Jersey and 
California, have eschewed or ignored customary use in favor of 
other doctrinal approaches, such as the expansion of the public trust 
doctrine beyond the mean high water line, and implied dedication.63  
The leading and most expansive customary use case is State ex rel. 
Thornton v. Hayes, decided in 1969 by the Supreme Court of 
Oregon.64  In that case, the Court effectively threw all of the dry sand 
beaches of Oregon open to the public on the theory that all of the 
beaches of the State had been used since time immemorial, referring 
back to the use of the beach by Native Americans.  Thornton has 
been criticized for its lack of fealty to the common law roots of 
customary use, which suggest that the use should be considered in 
geographically specific contexts.65  Thornton was followed by 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.  In that case, the Court found that 
customary use was a “background principle” of Oregon property 
law such that its application did not support a takings challenge, and 
that Oregon statutory law simply recognized and applied the 
doctrine for regulatory and local government planning purposes.66  
The United States Supreme Court refused to consider the case, but 
the denial of certiorari was accompanied by a written dissent from 
Justice Scalia that should serve as a cautionary tale for those 
interpreting and applying the doctrine under state law.67     
   
Hawaii is unique due to the strong influence of indigenous 
(Native Hawaiian) customary law on its common law.  While the 
Hawaii Supreme Court looked to the theories that underlie the 
 
63. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).  
64. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).  
65. David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and 
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1418–26 (1996).  
66. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454–55 (Or. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).  
67. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). 
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importation of customary use from England, these seemed more 
designed to bolster the conclusion that traditional Hawaiians’ 
entitlement to use rights stemmed from the State’s recognition of the 
primacy of indigenous customary law.68   
 
In 1998, North Carolina amended a statute, which defined 
the seaward boundary of property within the state as the mean high 
water mark, to add language recognizing the right of the public to 
use the full extent of the dry sand beaches throughout the state.69 The 
statute references both the “frequent, uninterrupted, and 
unobstructed” use of the full extent of the dry sand beach “from time 
immemorial” and the right of the people to “customary free use” 
under the common law and as part of the common heritage 
recognized in the state Constitution.70 This same section also 
describes these rights as “public trust rights.”71  A 2015 decision by 
North Carolina’s intermediate appellate court confirmed that this 
statute and other provisions of state law recognized and codified 
public trust rights in privately-owned land.72 The court noted that its 
opinion was the first appellate opinion to confirm the existence of 
these rights, and noted that it was unclear whether custom and public 
trust rights are separate doctrines in North Carolina, or whether 
custom has been used to determine where and how public trust rights 
arise.73  The court rejected the takings claim raised by landowner 
plaintiffs to an ordinance adopted by the Town of Emerald Isle 
authorizing driving on the dry sand beach, in part because the right 
to prevent the public from enjoying the dry sand portion of the 
 
68. Public Access Shoreline v. Hawai’i Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 
(Haw. 1995). 
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §77-20(d)–(e) (2018). 
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §77-20(d) (2018). 
71. Id. 
72. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
The other state statutes the court cited that recognize and codify customary free 
use of the beaches are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2018) (defining and protecting 
from adverse possession public trust use rights) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-
134.1(b) (2018) (legislative finding that beaches and coastal waters have been 
customarily freely used throughout the State). 
73. Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 196. 
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property was never part of the “bundle of rights” purchased by 
plaintiffs.74 
 
Texas was the early adopter when it comes to explicitly 
recognizing the customary use doctrine for recreational beach 
access.  In 1959, Texas passed the “Open Beaches Act,” which 
provides for recreational dry sand rights  “if the public has acquired 
a right of use or easement to or over an area by prescription, 
dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in 
the public ….”75  While the application of the beach access law has 
had a number of twists and turns in Texas, the Open Beaches Act 
has consistently been interpreted by Texas courts as a  recognition 
of common law custom (as well as dedication and prescription), and 
not as the creation or expansion of new rights.76 
 
The U.S. Virgin Islands arguably went further than Texas, 
by enacting legislation that made explicit legislative findings of 
customary use, as well as preserving and regulating customary use 
on the Island’s beaches.77 The Open Shorelines Act provides: “The 
Legislature recognizes that the public has made frequent, 
uninterrupted and unobstructed use of the shorelines of the Virgin 
Islands throughout Danish rule and under American rule as recently 
as the nineteen fifties. It is the intent of the Legislature to preserve 
what has been a tradition and to protect what has become a right of 
the public.”78 It further declares and affirms that “the public, 
individually and collectively, has and shall continue to have the right 
to use and enjoy the shorelines of the United States Virgin Islands,” 
and defines the shorelines as the area from the low tide line fifty feet 
landward or to the vegetation line or a natural barrier, whichever is 
the shortest distance.79  In 1979, the Federal District Court with 
jurisdiction in the Territory affirmed the validity of the statute under 
the United States Constitution and, citing Blackstone, reaffirmed the 
 
74. Id. at 197 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992). 
75. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.  § 61.014 (West 2017) (emphasis added). 
76. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W. 2d 95 (Tex. 1986); Arrington v. Mattox, 767 
S.W. 2d 957 (Tex. 1989); Brannan v. State, 365 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex. 2010). 
77.  V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 401 (2017). 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at § 402. 
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customary use doctrine as a recognized principle of property law in 
the Virgin Islands.80  
 
Of the four states and one territory that have explicitly 
recognized customary use as a fundamental attribute of the law of 
property in their jurisdiction, only Florida had not recognized the 
doctrine in statute—until it passed the statute at hand.  As a matter 
of the common law, Florida recognized the customary use doctrine 
in the Tona-Rama case, discussed in detail below.   
 
B. The Tona-Rama Case: Customary Use Rights in Florida 
 
The first case in Florida to recognize the doctrine of 
customary use rights, City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,81 
involved a conflict between the owner of an observation tower in 
Daytona Beach (Tona-Rama) and the owner of the Main Street Pier 
(McMillan and Wright) which sought to construct a competing 
observation tower that would cover approximately 230 square feet 
of dry sand beach directly adjacent to the pier.  This area was a small 
portion of roughly 15,300 square feet of dry sand beach McMillan 
and Wright owned and on which it paid taxes.   
 
McMillan and Wright had obtained a permit and begun 
construction when Tona-Rama sued.  Tona-Rama claimed, in part, 
that the observation tower would interfere with prescriptive rights 
obtained by the public, under the theory that the use by the public 
was adverse, continuous for more than 20 years, and open and 
notorious.  As is noted above, the elements for proving prescription 
are similar to those required under the doctrine of adverse 
possession; however, a claimant under prescription only asserts and 
only acquires use rights rather than ownership rights.  Tona-Rama 
failed to secure a preliminary injunction, and so by the time the case 
 
80. United States. v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, 
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (V.I. 1974); see also Aliya T. Felix, Note, “Take Back the 
Beach!” An Analysis of the Need for Enforcement of Beach Access Rights for 
Virgin Islanders, 10 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 419 (2015); Jesse Reiblich & 
Thomas T. Ankersen, Got Guts? The Iconic Streams of the U.S. Virgin Islands 
and the Law’s Ephemeral Edge, 32 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 71, 102-04 (2017). 
81. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). 
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reached the Florida Supreme Court, McMillan and Wright’s 
observation tower had been constructed at a cost of over $125,000.   
 
The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Adkins joined by three other Justices, concluded that there was no 
prescriptive easement in the public because the public’s use could 
not be deemed adverse to or inconsistent with the owner’s use and 
enjoyment of the land.82  It found that the public’s use of the dry 
sand around the pier was in no way inimical to the landowner’s 
interests, and that the public was “the lifeblood of the pier” and had 
“been welcomed to utilize the otherwise unused sands.”83  
 
However, the Court went on to consider whether there were 
other rights that the public had to the beaches of Florida and 
concluded that such rights should and do exist in Florida pursuant to 
the doctrine of customary use.  It held: 
 
[i]f the recreational use of the sandy area adjacent to mean 
high tide has been ancient, reasonable, without interruption 
and free from dispute, such use, as a matter of custom, 
should not be interfered with by the owner.  However, the 
owner may make any use of his property which is consistent 
with such public use and not calculated to interfere with the 
exercise of the right of the public to enjoy the dry sand areas 
as a recreational adjunct of the wet sand or foreshore area.84 
 
In its opinion, the Court made clear that the customary use 
right was not an interest in the land, but merely a right of use. The 
Court noted that the right of use cannot be revoked by the 
landowner, but is subject to appropriate governmental regulation, 
and that it may be abandoned by the public.   
 
After this strong and unequivocal embrace of customary use 
rights, in a single sentence the Court concluded that construction of 
the tower was nonetheless consistent with the general recreational 
use by the public and therefore the tower could remain. There is little 
 
82. Id. at 77. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 78. 
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elaboration on this key point in the opinion.85  Clearly, as to the 230 
square feet covered by the tower, traditional beach recreation was 
completely precluded, which raises the question of why the Court 
found the tower to be consistent with customary recreational use.  
 
One possible explanation for this conclusion that the tower 
was consistent with general recreational use is that when compared 
with the broad expanse of dry sand beach still available to the public, 
the small footprint of the tower was not significant enough to 
constitute an inconsistent use or interference by the landowner with 
the public’s rights on that tract of land.  This reasoning would 
support the Court’s conclusion that the tower was a reasonable use 
by the landowner and did not interfere with the public’s use, even 
though it physically blocked any use of the 230 square feet beneath 
the tower.  While not explicitly adopted by the Court, this type of 
proportionality analysis would seem consistent with the outcome.  
This explanation for the ruling also aligns with concerns expressed 
in both the majority and dissenting opinions – that the landowner 
paid taxes on the dry sand beach and that the public had use of most 
of the vast swath of dry sand owned by McMillan and Wright.  With 
the tower, the owners only occupied a small proportion of the dry 
sand beach they owned (roughly 1.5% of the area). 
 
Three Justices dissented from the majority’s decision, all 
three of whom believed that the public’s use in the case should be 
considered adverse to the landowner’s and therefore that 
prescription had been established. The three also concluded that the 
tower interfered with the public’s rights.86 Two of the dissenters also 
explicitly agreed with the finding of customary use. Nonetheless, 
two of the three dissenters expressed concern for the equities of 
requiring removal of the tower, with one of them only dissenting in 
part,  therefore concurring with the outcome (allowing the tower to 
stand) but dissenting from the rationale; the other agreed with the 
rationale but proposed a different remedy--- allowing the owner to 
recoup its investment and only then requiring removal of the tower.    
 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 79-82. 
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This decision was later noted in two cases decided by 
Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal, the lower court whose 
decision was appealed in the Tona-Rama case.  In Reynolds v. Cnty 
of Volusia, the court declined to apply the doctrine of customary use 
but in dictum wrote that the customary use doctrine “requires the 
courts to ascertain in each case the degree of customary and ancient 
use the beach has been subjected to and, in addition, to balance 
whether the proposed use of the land by the fee owners will interfere 
with such use enjoyed by the public in the past.”87   
 
In Trepanier v. Cnty of Volusia, landowners challenged the 
public’s use of their property for driving and parking, while 
conceding that the public had customary use rights for bathing, 
swimming, and general recreation.88  In rejecting the trial judge’s 
conclusion that customary use for driving and parking existed, the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal emphasized the lack of reference in 
the lower court’s findings to any proof that the specific lots of the 
plaintiffs’ had been used by cars, as opposed to use of the sand beach 
in the general area for driving and parking.89  
 
The Court in Trepanier acknowledged that it was unclear 
whether, in Tona-Rama, the Supreme Court had considered the right 
of customary use only for the area of beach at issue in that case, or 
whether it had considered the dry sandy beach in the general vicinity 
of Daytona Beach or something else.90 However, it expressed its 
view that the Supreme Court had not intended “to announce a right 
by custom for public use of the entire sandy beach area of the entire 
state of Florida.”91 Based on this understanding, the court went on to 
offer guidance on the proof needed to support a finding of customary 
use.   
  
The Court noted that it “read Tona-Rama to require proof 
that the general area of the beach where Appellants' property is 
 
87. Reynolds v. Cnty. of Volusia, 659 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.1995).  
88. Trepanier v. Cnty. of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2007). 
89. Id. at 290. 
90. Id. at 287. 
91. Id. at 288.   
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located has customarily been put to such use and that the extent of 
such customary use on private property is consistent with the 
public's claim of right.”92  
 
The Court also questioned a conclusion by the trial judge that 
the public’s use rights could migrate as the tide line migrates.  The 
trial judge had noted:  
 
The easterly lot lines erode as the sovereign land 
shifts landward and, in between the moving 
boundary of the sovereign tideland (or foreshore) and 
the plaintiffs' lots, the public right also shifts with the 
tide….The area of public use cannot be bounded with 
reference to a static line since the beach, and hence 
the public's use of it, fluctuates landward and 
seaward over time. The public right, if it is to reflect 
the reality of the public's actual use of the beach, 
must migrate. The law cannot freeze such a right at 
one place any more than the law can freeze the beach 
itself. 93 
 
However, the Court did not rule on this legal question.  
Analyzing the factual record in the case, the Court ultimately 
concluded that migration of the public’s customary use of the beach 
is a matter of proof and that genuine issues of material fact 
remained.94 However, the Court expressed substantial uncertainty 
regarding whether customary use should migrate under Florida 
law.95 
 
C.  A Note on Special Injury 
 
To fully understand the dynamics of private and public rights 
in this context, it is important to mention a rule established by the 
Florida Supreme Court that affects who has standing to sue which 
places members of the beachgoing public at a disadvantage in 
 
92. Id. at 290.  
93. Id. at 282–83. 
94. Id. at 293 
95. Id. 
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gaining access to the courts to assert customary use rights.  The 
special injury rule, as it is known, was established by the Florida 
Supreme Court in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachin.96  In order to 
establish standing, the rule requires a party to allege an injury that is 
different in degree and kind from the injury suffered by the 
community at large. This rule has been held to apply in suits to 
enjoin a public nuisance based on purpresture, and for blocking 
public rights to the beach acquired through prescriptive easement, 
implied dedication, and/or custom.97  
 
This rule therefore acts as a significant obstacle for members 
of the beach-going public who might wish to assert customary use 
when this right is shared with a large segment of the public, as it 
may be in many cases. This was not an obstacle in Daytona Beach 
v. Tona-Rama because the plaintiff in that case had an economic 
interest—as the operator of a competing observation tower. Thus, 
Tona-Rama was able to assert the rights to use the dry sand beach 
that it shared with the public. The special injury rule is particularly 
burdensome for plaintiffs seeking access to a beach because, in most 
situations, everyone in the community would be denied the same 
access and therefore almost no one would have an injury different 
in degree and kind from the injury suffered by the community at 
large. In fact, the rule creates a paradox—the more the community 
is harmed by a lack of access to the beach, the less likely a plaintiff 
is to be able to establish standing. This paradox has been noted in 
legal scholarship on this topic,98 and some have suggested that the 
state legislature should address the situation.   
 
IV. SOURCES OF CONFUSION AND CONFLICT 
 
Incomplete or flawed understanding of three basic issues has 
fueled the conflict surrounding beach access in parts of Florida 
today. These are: (1) the status of common law customary use rights 
in the absence of a judicial determination of those rights, (2) the 
 
96. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachin, 200 So. 238, 239 (Fla. 1941). 
97. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9, 11-13 (Fla. 
1974) 
98. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of 
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L. Q. 755, 761 (2001). 
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status of a local ordinance recognizing customary use rights in the 
absence of a judicial determination under the common law, and (3) 
the impact of HB 631 on the public’s common law customary use 
rights and on beachfront landowner’s property rights.  
Misunderstanding of these three topics has led to significant 
confusion over the effect of HB 631 and the relative public and 
private rights to the dry sand beach in the absence of a local 
ordinance. 
 
A. Common Law Rights and the Judicial Process 
 
As discussed above, both private rights to property generally 
and the public’s right to use the privately-owned dry sand beach 
under the customary use doctrine are rights that have their roots in 
the common law. A landowner who claims fee simple title to a 
parcel of beachfront property that extends to the water claims that 
title under long-established background principles of the common 
law of property. Some of that common law has been codified and 
modified by statutes. Where a statute has validly modified the 
common law, it supersedes the common law. If no statutory 
provision has modified the underlying common law, the common 
law rights exist under the terms embodied in the common law. In 
either case, under background common law property principles and 
relevant statutory law, a landowner may have good title and a 
member of the public may have customary use rights, whether or 
not these rights have been challenged and established in court. This 
is a critical point at issue in the contest between private and public 
rights. A central argument articulated by some defending the new 
requirements imposed by HB 631 is that the new law was necessary 
to curb an incursion by local governments’ legislative branches into 
the prerogatives of the judiciary. They argue that it is improper for 
a local government’s legislative body to adopt an ordinance 
recognizing and regulating customary use rights before the judiciary 
has determined that these rights exist. But if this theory is correct, it 
could also be argued that county ordinances that seek to prohibit 
nuisances are similarly inappropriate. Like customary use, the 
existence of a nuisance is a determination under common law that 
can be made by a court.  
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Moreover, this argument reflects a basic misunderstanding 
about the nature of rights in the absence of a judicial determination. 
Were it correct that rights recognized at common law do not exist in 
advance of a judicial determination, this broader principle also could 
affect recognition of landowners’ property rights to the dry sand 
beach. 
 
Of course, landowners’ property rights differ from 
customary use rights because they are property—not merely use—
rights and are grounded not just in common law but in a deed that 
grants title. This is indeed a significant distinction. However, the 
broader point is that just like customary use rights, many aspects of 
landowners’ rights, including, for example, the location of the 
oceanward boundary of their property, are heavily dependent on 
determinations requiring application of ancient, archaic, and 
complex common law to their particular parcel – determinations that 
are within the purview of the judiciary. For example, determining 
property boundaries at the water’s edge under the law of accretion, 
erosion, avulsion, and reliction is notoriously complex and highly 
fact-dependent. However, a judicial determination quieting title in 
the owner or determining the property’s boundaries has never been 
a prerequisite to the landowner having or asserting valid ownership 
rights within the boundaries the landowner believes to be valid. The 
courts provide a mechanism for dispute resolution when conflicts 
arise, but there is no precondition that all rights must be judicially 
declared before they can exist.99   
 
  The same is true for a person claiming rights under a 
contract. Those rights exist and can be asserted without a prior 
judicial determination that they exist. If someone wishes to 
challenge those asserted contractual rights, they can do so through 
litigation, which can result in a determination that the rights either 
do or do not exist as claimed. If the court rules in favor of the party 
claiming rights, the court generally is determining not whether to 
create those rights, but whether those rights existed before litigation 
was filed and before the court ruled that they were valid.  Courts 
 
99. This is consistent with the understanding of the essential role of the judicial 
branch that underlies the rationale Judge Rodgers adopted in the ruling in the 
Alford case, discussed infra. 
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resolve disputes regarding parties’ relative rights, but there is no rule 
requiring a judicial determination in order for the rights to be valid 
or to come into existence. Similarly, actions may constitute a 
nuisance and if they do, the nuisance exists before any judicial 
determination in a suit seeking a remedy. Indeed, an award of 
damages for past conduct inherently acknowledges the fact that the 
nuisance existed before the judicial determination that recognizes it. 
 
While customary use rights differ in that they arise from use 
rather than a contract or deed or action constituting a nuisance, the 
use, like the contract or the deed or the action constituting a 
nuisance, is a preexisting fact with legal consequences.  The rights 
arising from the use may exist without regard to whether a court has 
yet determined that they exist. In other words, the public may 
already have common law customary use rights on any given stretch 
of privately-owned beach in the state of Florida—whether or not 
those rights have been either codified or judicially determined.100  
Yet property owners and others have shown confusion on this basic 
point.  Understanding that the public’s asserted rights may precede 
a judicial determination of their existence – as do the rights of a 
landowner or a party to a contract—is an important starting point for 
analyzing the relative rights of beachgoers and landowners.   
 
Many of the more extravagant claims being made by 
landowners in coastal areas currently center on the idea that they 
have the right to exclude the public and that their claim to ownership 
trumps even valid customary use rights that the public may already 
have.101 This is mistaken. Landowners may wish to challenge the 
public’s customary use rights and can do so. Were a conflict to reach 
court, whether by virtue of a plaintiff beach user bringing a suit to 
 
100. Even scholars who favor a very limited approach to judicial adoption of 
customary use acknowledge this.  See Bederman, supra note 37, at 1450 n. 453 
(acknowledging that customary rights predate judicial determination). 
101. Annie Blanks, Customary use battle reaches boiling point in Walton 
County, NWF DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2018), 
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20180714/customary-use-battle-reaches-
boiling-point-in-walton-county [https://perma.cc/8ZY8-HRQY]; Ryan Nicol, 
Banning the beach? Locals start enforcing new access law, FLORIDA POLITICS 
(July 9, 2018), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/268309-two-women-leave-
private-beach [https://perma.cc/J4CN-9EW2].  
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claim customary use,102 or a landowner suing to eject the beach user, 
the burden of proof on the claim of customary use would lie with 
the beach user. Therefore, it is not necessarily true that members of 
the public are trespassing if they use the dry sand beach in the 
absence of a judicial determination of customary use; however, 
neither is there a presumption that the public has customary use 
rights in any given area. 
 
This lack of clarity produces the dilemma that Walton 
County faced, which led to the enactment of its first ordinance on 
customary use rights.  Lacking certainty, a local government must, 
in essence, take sides and either assume that the public lacks 
customary use rights or that the public has customary use rights in a 
given location.  If it accedes to landowners’ requests that beachgoers 
be removed as trespassers, it risks violating the public's customary 
use rights (and alienating tourists and beachgoers on whom the local 
economy may depend).  If it fails to exercise its enforcement 
discretion to remove tourists in this murky situation, it risks 
angering beachfront property owners claiming the right to exclude 
the public. Similarly, if landowners erect barriers, law enforcement 
officers must decide whether the obstruction interferes with the 
public’s customary use rights or not.  In Walton County, this placed 
the Sheriff's office in the uncomfortable position of making 
judgments on complex and fact-intensive legal matters as well as 
deciding whether and how to exercise its enforcement in a 
politically-charged context.103  
 
Neither position is clearly correct or clearly wrong.  Local 
governments must decide whether and how to mediate the 
respective rights of the public and beachfront landowners.  If 
customary use rights exist, then the local government arguably 
should respect these rights and risks abusing its discretion should it 
 
102. A substantial obstacle to a member of the public bringing such a suit is the 
special injury rule, discussed supra Part III(c). 
103. Steve Bousquet, Rick Scott Uses Executive Power in an Attempt to Quiet 
Beach Access Furor, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 13, 2018), 
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/13/rick-scott-uses-
executive-action-in-attempt-to-quiet-beach-access-furor/ 
[https://perma.cc/7Q69-PZWY]. 
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wrongly treat the public as trespassers on the dry sand beach.  But if 
the public has neither customary use rights, a prescriptive easement, 
nor other grounds for use (such as nourishment creating public 
beach below the Erosion Control Line), then the local government 
has grounds to act to protect the rights of the landowners against 
trespassers.  However, because enforcement is a highly 
discretionary power,104 and because of the uncertainty that surrounds 
these determinations in most situations, the local government has 
considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to devote 
enforcement resources to eject trespassers from the dry sand beach.   
B. The Interplay between Customary Use Ordinances and 
Common Law Customary Use Rights 
 
By enacting an ordinance through the local legislative 
process in 2017,105 the Walton County Commission sought to create 
clarity and reduce conflict. Adopting an ordinance to codify, clarify, 
and regulate customary use rights can be a highly effective way to 
mediate the conflicts that arise over beach use rights.  It can clarify 
the murky physical and legal contours of the rights under the 
common law described above.  Adopting an ordinance also allows 
the local government to build on the foundation of customary use 
rights and private landowners' property rights to design a set of rules 
that will be easier for people to understand and easier to enforce than 
the common law.  It can provide needed transparency, helping to be 
sure everyone knows their rights and what the rules are.  The local 
government can regulate these rights, tailoring a solution that 
addresses the unique situation of their community – people’s 
concerns, historic patterns of use, and the changing shoreline. 
However, in adopting the ordinance, the local government is 
asserting, at least preliminarily by legislative process, that 
customary use rights exist, as well as regulating those rights and 
ensuring they are protected from interference. Those affected by the 
 
104. See State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986) (“Under Florida's 
constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, 
and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to 
prosecute.”). 
105. WALTON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2 (amended Mar. 28, 
2017, effective Apr. 1, 2017). 
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ordinance can still seek judicial review of these findings as well as 
the legal basis for the ordinance.  
 
Local governments have the authority to enact ordinances 
through their police powers. Police powers are broad and provide 
the power to protect public safety, public health, morality, peace and 
quiet, and law and order.106 As a creature of the state, a local 
government may only exercise the powers that the state expressly 
grants to it.107 Florida is a ‘Home Rule’ state because the Florida 
Constitution broadly delegated power to its local governments.108 
Local governments in Florida can now exercise “any governmental, 
corporate, or proprietary power for a municipal purpose except 
when expressly prohibited by law.”109 
 
Walton County’s legislative determination that customary 
use existed was upheld by the Federal District Court in a ruling in 
Alford v. Walton County,110 interpreting Florida law.  The court 
concluded that Walton County had not acted outside the scope of its 
local home rule authority or usurped a function reserved for the 
judiciary—in this case making legislative findings on the existence 
of common law customary use on its beaches.111  The decision in the 
Alford case, later vacated by order of the Eleventh Circuit, referred 
back to the two counties that had already adopted customary use 
 
106. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).  
107. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 
1872). 
108. FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. VIII, § 2(b). 
109. City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992).  
110. Alford v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:16-CV-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115, 
at **11-12 
 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2017) (ruling on cross motions for summary judgment on 
challenges to Customary Use Ordinance, holding that Customary Use Ordinance 
was “a valid exercise of constitutional and statutory ‘home rule’ authority” by 
Walton County and did not usurp judicial function by precluding individual 
property owners from seeking judicial review of the ordinance as applied to their 
property). This order and judgment were subsequently vacated at the direction of 
the Eleventh Circuit without explanation, apparently in response to arguments 
that the legislative invalidation of the ordinance mooted the claim. Alford v. 
Walton Cnty., No. 17-15741-BB, 2018 BL 229216 (11th Cir. June 27, 2018) 
(granting appellants’ motion to vacate District Court order and judgment 
concerning customary use ordinance claim).  
111. See supra note 100. 
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ordinances—St. Johns and Volusia—and to Tona-Rama and 
Trepanier for affirmation of the validity of this exercise of 
legislative power.  The Court pointed out that in both instances, the 
counties had expressly stated that their ordinances were not intended 
to preclude private property owners subject to the ordinance from 
challenging its application to their property in court.112 Trepanier 
demonstrates that private property owners could do just that.  It is 
noteworthy, that with the exception of the Trepanier case, Volusia 
and St. Johns County appear to have been free from litigation under 
their customary use ordinances. 
 
C.  Legislative Intervention: The Impact of HB 631 on 
Customary Use Rights 
 
1.  Understanding What HB 631 Doesn’t Do  
 
This leads to what is perhaps the heart of the confusion about 
HB 631, its impact on the public's rights to use any given beach 
along Florida's coast.  As is explained above, those rights may exist 
without regard to whether there has been litigation determining their 
existence.  If the public’s use meets the test set forth in Tona-Rama, 
 
112. Alford v. Walton County, No. 3:16-CV-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115, 
at *11 
 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2017), Judge Rodgers quoted the Volusia County ordinance 
which stated: 
It is not the intent of the Charter or of this chapter to affect in any way the title 
of the owner of land adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean, or to impair the right of any 
such owner to contest the existence of the customary right of the public to access 
and use any particular area of privately owned beach, or to reduce or limit any 
rights of public access or use that may exist or arise other than as customary 
rights.  
Id. at *14 (quoting VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-82).  
Judge Rodgers also noted that:  
The Volusia County ordinance also stated that the county’s intent was “to 
determine as a legislative fact binding on county government that since time 
immemorial the public has enjoyed access to the beach and has made 
recreational use of the beach; [and] that such use has been ancient, reasonable, 
without interruption, and free from dispute.”  (citing Trepanier v. Cty. of 
Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). 
Id.  
The Order also noted almost identical language from the St. Johns County 
ordinance. Id. at n. 29. 
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then those rights already exist.  Perhaps the most important (and 
most frequently misunderstood) point about the new law, evidenced 
by the inaccurate media reporting, is that HB 631 in no way changes 
common law customary use rights that may exist presently—
whether or not those rights have yet been judicially recognized.113  
Nor does it change the common law standards by which the public 
may have beach use rights under any other theories such as 
prescription, dedication, or public trust.  In other words, the new law 
does not affect the public’s common law rights to use the beach as it 
has been accustomed to, unless and until a local government chooses 
to go forward with the adoption of an ordinance under HB 631’s 
statutorily prescribed process. 
 
What  HB 631 accomplished is to have uniquely invalidated 
Walton County's ordinance114 and imposed new procedural 
requirements on those local governments that seek to codify 
customary use rights of beachgoers after July 1, 2018.115   The statute 
created a new judicial process which it required local governments 
to pursue before they could enact a customary use ordinance. 
However, prior to the effective date of the law, local governments 
were free to enact ordinances following their usual notice and 
 
113. Examples of confusion beginning at the time of the Bill’s adoption abound.  
See, e.g., Travis Cohen, Rick Scott Just Signed a Bill That Could Make Many of 
Florida's Beaches Private, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/rick-scott-just-signed-a-bill-that-could-
make-many-of-floridas-beaches-private-10231813, [https://perma.cc/UK9W-
S5NR];  Josh Cascio, Public, landowner opinions split on Florida's new beach 
rules, FOX 13 NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.fox13news.com/news/local-
news/public-landowner-opinions-split-on-floridas-new-beach-rules, 
[https://perma.cc/MUS2-UES8]; Ryan Nicol, Banning the beach? Locals start 
enforcing new access law, FLORIDA POLITICS (July 9, 2018), 
http://floridapolitics.com/archives/268309-two-women-leave-private-beach, 
[https://perma.cc/Z9VK-S4K6] (Walton County Sheriff reported as stating that 
under HB 631, beaches that are part of private property are now equivalent to a 
person’s backyard. “There’s absolutely no difference between a neighborhood 
home in the middle of somewhere and walking on the beach.”). 
114. The uncertainty on this point reflects an ambiguity in the statute discussed 
in the annotated statutory analysis in Part V.a, infra. 
115. Because they were in place before January 1, 2016, St. Johns County and 
Volusia County’s ordinances were excluded from the statutory preemption. See 
FLA. STAT. §163.035(4). 
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hearing process, and the District Court in Alford had affirmed that it 
was within their power to do so. 116 Thus, the rationale articulated by 
the Bill’s sponsors for requiring counties to seek a judicial 
declaration of customary use—that enactment of an ordinance 
grounded in customary use constituted a legislative usurpation of a 
judicial function—has been rejected by a Federal District Court in a 
case challenging the ordinance 
Moreover, before the new law’s enactment, landowners had 
a readily available judicial remedy in the event they believed such 
an ordinance to be invalid either because it was ultra vires or 
because it effected a taking without just compensation or on other 
grounds. If landowners wanted to challenge such an ordinance, they 
could seek judicial review of the facial validity of the ordinance or 
challenge its specific application to their parcel, as the plaintiffs did 
in Trepanier.  Thus, the claim that the new law was needed to protect 
the judiciary’s prerogative is puzzling, since the judiciary could 
easily have rectified any such incursion if a local government’s 
action generated controversy and a landowner sought judicial 
review, as a number of landowners had.117  Nevertheless, HB 631 
required that after July 1, 2018, a local government adopting an 
ordinance premised on customary use rights first notify all the 
beachfront owners that might be implicated, and then proceed to 
court for a “declaration of customary use.”118  Importantly, this court 
proceeding is not a suit directed against the landowners, but a 
request that the court decide the legal issue of whether there are 
customary use rights in a designated area, even in the absence of a 
fact-specific dispute on any given parcel.  The result of the 
 
116. Alford v. Walton Cty., No. 3:16-cv-362/MCR/CJK, 2017 WL 8785115, at 
*11 (Order vacated by Alford v. Walton Cty., No. 17-15741-BB, 2018 BL 
229216 (11th Cir. June 27, 2018). 
117. One further possible argument in favor of the statute is that it would reduce 
litigation by channeling all claims into one judicial proceeding. However, as is 
noted below, it is not at all clear whether all challenges to the ordinance would 
properly be raised in the newly created judicial proceeding, or whether the 
existence of customary use rights is the sole issue in such a proceeding.  In 
addition, courts could address multiplicity of litigation, at least in part, by 
consolidating cases.   
118. FLA. STAT. §163.035(3) (2018). 
2020] Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach 37 
 
proceeding is to ensure that a court decides the question of whether 
the public has customary use rights in that area before any ordinance 
goes into effect.  The new law gives every affected landowner the 
right to intervene in the proceeding if they want to, but they are not 
required to participate.119  However, the law is silent as to whether 
members of the public or their advocates have any right to intervene.  
This perhaps explains the widespread perception that the new law 
represented an attack on the public’s rights: HB 631 did make 
codification and recognition of the public’s customary use rights by 
local governments more difficult.  In doing so, the law placed 
additional burdens on the preexisting process available for asserting 
and clarifying public customary use rights.  If one seeks to assess 
the impact of HB 631 on the balance of public and private rights, it 
seems fair to say that the law placed a thumb on the scale in favor 
of beachfront landowners and against assertion of public customary 
use rights.120  When one adds this to the impact of the special injury 
rule, this is arguably not insignificant.  Thus, despite the inaccurate 
and exaggerated nature of the claims regarding the law’s impact on 
the public’s use rights, there is a kernel of truth in characterizing it 
as an effort to weaken the public’s rights.  This kernel finds 
substance in the extensive advocacy on behalf of landowners and 
property rights advocates in the courts and the legislature seeking to 
diminish public customary use rights.  While landowners and their 
advocates frame these efforts in terms of protecting private property 
rights, these efforts would be achieved by creating new hurdles for 
local governments to clear before recognizing and codifying 
customary use rights.  
 
119. FLA. STAT. §163.035(b)(1)(2018). 
120. Statements by one of the Bill’s sponsors and by the incoming Senate 
President suggest that the intent of the Bill was to protect private property rights. 
See Pittman, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Kathleen Passidomo as stating that “she 
found it ‘appalling’ that a city or county can pass an ordinance undercutting 
private property rights.  ‘If you’re going to take away somebody’s property you 
have to do it through the courts’”); News Service of Florida, supra note 7 
(quoting Senate President Bill Galvano as stating, “I think there was a lot of 
misunderstanding around that bill, and I was very clear through the summer, and 
when members would call, to emphasize what we were doing was just bolstering 
private property rights”).  
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Nonetheless, nothing in the law can be fairly construed to 
affect the public's preexisting common law customary use rights, or 
private landowners' preexisting common law rights to exclude in 
any way.  These co-relative rights remain in theoretical equipoise 
until they are determined under the common law process or under 
the statutory process, pursuant to local ordinance.  Private 
landowners have no greater right to exclude the public either by 
physical barrier or by invoking trespass laws than they had prior to 
the law's enactment. Moreover, beachgoers in those communities 
that choose not to enact an ordinance pursuant to the statute have 
every right to assert their customary use rights, until a court prohibits 
it. If a trespass claim were brought against them, the beachgoers 
would prevail if they successfully proved their claim of customary 
use rights.  However, the likelihood of such a prosecution in the 
current climate seems low.121 
  
Whatever common law customary use rights beachgoers 
had in Walton County before the enactment of HB 631, these rights 
remained after the enactment of the law and after its effective date 
of July 1, 2018.  What HB 631 changed was that it appeared to 
uniquely invalidate the Walton County ordinance,122 thereby 
 
121. Compare Steve Bousquet, Rick Scott Uses Executive Power in an Attempt 
to Quiet Beach Access Furor, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 13, 2018), 
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/13/rick-scott-uses-
executive-action-in-attempt-to-quiet-beach-access-furor/, 
[https://perma.cc/7Q69-PZWY] (quoting State Attorney for judicial circuit that 
includes Walton County as stating “Any person trespassing on private property 
above the high water line may be subject to arrest”)with Brittany Weiner, New 
Florida Law Changes Beach Access in the Panhandle, NEWS 4 (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.wsmv.com/news/new-florida-law-changes-beach-access-in-the-
panhandle/article_fbe8ae36-5f9b-5452-ac19-
4c2af5068338.html#.W08ICV9XpRE.email, [https://perma.cc/SH7Q-Q33E] 
(quoting Walton County Sheriff explaining decision not to enforce trespass law 
on dry sand beach based on attorney’s legal guidance that trespassing on the 
beach cannot result in prosecution). Governor Scott’s Executive Order, while 
not addressing privately owned beaches, also urged state attorneys to “take 
appropriate actions to ensure that the ability of the public to access Florida’s 
public beaches in accordance with longstanding Florida law is preserved and is 
not infringed.” Fla. Exec. Order No. 18-202 (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/EO-18-202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SCD4-YK8D]. 
122. The ambiguity surrounding this issue is discussed further below. 
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invalidating the County’s legislative overlay on the common law.  
However, any common law rights under the customary use doctrine 
are unaffected by the new law, a key point that the general public 
and private property owners, fueled by media coverage of the issue, 
often failed to grasp.123  
 
By apparent design, under a grandparenting provision included 
in the measure preventing its application to ordinances adopted and 
in effect on or before January 1, 2016, the Walton County ordinance 
was the only extant ordinance affected by the law; the provision 
preserved all other counties’ ordinances that predated Walton 
County’s.  In fact, only two counties had adopted customary use 
ordinances prior to Walton County’s effort—Volusia County of 
Tona-Rama fame and St. Johns County, its northern neighbor.  As 
noted above, neither of these ordinances have been facially 
challenged, and both explicitly preserve beachfront property 
owner’s right to challenge customary use on their dry sand beach.124     
2.     A Confounding Wrinkle 
 
 The story does not end with the statutory preemption of 
local home rule authority to enact customary use ordinances 
pursuant to local processes, however.  Much of the detail of the new 
law was first introduced in a last-minute amendment on the floor of 
the House that replaced the initial two-sentence bill.  The final 
version included a new provision that seemed to preserve the right 
of local governments to enact a customary use ordinance until the 
effective date of the statute. It did so by providing that governmental 
entities may use customary use “as an affirmative defense in a 
proceeding challenging an ordinance or rule adopted before July 1, 
 
123. Blanks, supra note 91; Josh Cascio, Public, Landowner Opinions Split on 
Florida's New Beach Rules, FOX 13 NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), 
http://www.fox13news.com/news/local-news/public-landowner-opinions-split-
on-floridas-new-beach-rules, [https://perma.cc/V36A-FMNR]; Allie Raffa, The 
battle over beach access in Florida heats up, FOX NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/04/17/battle-over-beach-access-in-
florida-heats-up.html, [https://perma.cc/3BYN-UDPU]. 
124. See VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20-82; ST. JOHNS 
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.01. 
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2018,”125 seemingly in direct contradiction to the provision 
preserving from invalidation only ordinances passed before January 
1, 2016. There is no legislative history to parse.  While the rationale 
for this addition to the Bill is unclear, its import is equally so.  
Arguably, this gave local governments the right until July 1, 2018, 
to adopt the same sorts of ordinances that were otherwise 
invalidated, and then to defend the validity of those ordinances when 
they are challenged, which is presumably what would be done in 
any case.  This prompted another wave of public outcry and media 
attention as some local governments scrambled to meet the 
deadline.126 The import of these ordinances and how their legal 
status may differ from both the preexisting ordinances (Volusia and 
St. Johns) and post-enactment ordinances that use the statutorily 
mandated process, are questions that may need to be resolved if 
these ordinances are challenged as preempted. In contrast, Walton 
County has initiated the process outlined under Fla. Stat. 163.035 
seeking a declaration that customary use exists on all beaches within 
the County.127 However, heated conflict continues to bedevil the 
County’s effort to clarify the public’s rights.128 
 
D. The Governor’s Executive Order 
 
 Governor Scott’s involvement with this topic did not end 
with his signing of HB 631. In the wake of the new law’s enactment, 
he repeatedly sought to correct the record on the impact of the new 
law.  Perhaps because of the reality that the law made protection of 
public rights more difficult and energized landowners to assert 
 
125. H.R. 631, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018). 
126. There is no statewide clearinghouse for local ordinance adoption, so it is 
difficult to know with certainty how many jurisdictions took advantage of this 
apparent loophole.  However, at a minimum, “affirmative defense” ordinances 
have been adopted by Flagler County, Nassau County, Fernandina Beach, St. 
Petersburg and Naples. 
127. See Tom McLaughlin, Walton County Seeks Declaration of Customary 
Use,  NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2018) 
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20181214/walton-county-seeks-
declaration-of-customary-use. 
128. See Tom McLaughlin, Two Property Owners Escalate Walton Customary 
Use Debate, NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (July 8, 2019) 
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20190708/two-property-owners-escalate-
walton-customary-use-debate. 
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greater rights, these efforts were not entirely successful; media 
reports continued to characterize the law as restricting the public’s 
rights to use the beach. Landowners’ efforts to exclude tourists 
generated adverse publicity for a state dependent on tourism. Both 
the Bill’s sponsors129 and Governor Scott’s office130 sought to 
distance themselves from these unanticipated adverse impacts on 
beachgoers and to emphasize that the Bill’s impact was limited to 
the process local governments were required to follow in adopting 
ordinances. 
 
 Following the law’s effective date and the attendant 
renewed public attention, Governor Scott took an additional step.  
He issued an Executive Order titled “Preserving Public Beach 
Access.”131 The general thrust of the executive order was to buttress 
public access to publicly-owned beaches; however, regulation of the 
area affected by HB 631— privately owned beaches  — falls largely 
to local governments and outside the Governor’s jurisdiction (absent 
legislation authorizing him to act).  Thus, his Order focused 
primarily on state agencies and did little to resolve the conflict or 
alter the balance between public and private rights.  
 
 In Section 1, the Order directs the heads of state agencies 
headed by gubernatorial appointees not to adopt any rule restricting 
public access to any beach that has an established customary use, 
 
129. See Laura Ruane, Private Versus Public Beach Rights: We're Still Sorting 
Out What the New State Law Means, NAPLES NEWS (July 29, 2018), 
https://www.naplesnews.com/story/news/2018/07/29/southwest-florida-beaches-
governments-closely-watching-access-laws/858869002/; Raffa, supra note 113, 
[https://perma.cc/6PRK-JGVB] (reporting Sen. Passidomo as saying that the bill 
will actually expand beach access – not take it away); Katie Edwards-Walpole, 
Edwards-Walpole Defends Her Beach Access Law, SUN SENTINEL (July 28, 
2018), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-op-viewpoint-beach-access-
edwards-walpole-20180727-story.html, [https://perma.cc/5AFH-W8K5]. 
130. John Kennedy, Beach Lovers Push Back on New Property Rights Law, 
HERALD TRIBUNE (Apr. 16, 2018), 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180414/beach-lovers-push-back-on-new-
property-rights-law, [https://perma.cc/ABT2-6JJV] (quoting John Tupps, a 
spokesperson for the Governor, as stating that the law does not ban the public 
from accessing private beach areas or privatize beach access in any way). 
131. Fla. Exec. Order No. 18-202 (July 12, 2018), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/EO-18-202.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7K6-MM8A]. 
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unless necessary for public safety. Section 2 directs the Secretary of 
DEP and Director of the Florida State Parks system to engage in all 
appropriate efforts to ensure access to Florida’s public beaches is 
not restricted. It specifically directs creation of an online reporting 
tool for the public to report violations of their right to public beach 
access, as well as requiring a report to the legislature. 
 
 Recognizing the Executive’s lack of authority to direct 
local governments on this subject, Section 3 “urges” the heads of all 
other governmental entities to refrain from adopting rules or 
ordinances to restrict or eliminate access to Florida’s public 
beaches. Section 4 urges State Attorneys to take appropriate actions 
to ensure the ability to access Florida’s public beaches “in 
accordance with longstanding Florida law” is preserved and not 
infringed. 
 
 While the general direction of the order clearly seeks to 
protect public rights, its impact is circumscribed. First, in Section 1, 
the Order only affects agencies headed by an appointee serving at 
the governor’s pleasure; in other words, a subset of state agencies.  
Given that there had been no suggestion before or after HB 631’s 
passage that any state agencies had taken steps to interfere with the 
public’s rights on privately-owned dry sand beach, this section 
doesn’t address the root of the conflict over customary use.  
However, at the least, it preempted any efforts that state agencies 
might have taken to restrict public access to private beaches subject 
to customary use.  
 
 Section 1 also refers specifically to not impairing access to 
beaches with “established” customary use.  It is unclear what the 
term “established” is intended to signify.  It could mean that the 
Order merely refers to customary use already established in a 
judicial proceeding pursuant to HB 631 or those counties with 
grandfathered customary use ordinances (Volusia and St. Johns). If 
this is the meaning, then the Order leaves the balance where HB 631 
had left it.  If it means any customary use established through use, 
then it might seek to prevent impairment of access on other beaches 
where the public’s actions meet the standard for customary use. The 
2020] Recreational Rights to the Dry Sand Beach 43 
 
latter seems highly unlikely since it would amount to executive 
recognition of customary use. 
 
 Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Order are each of limited effect 
in that they address only access to publicly owned beaches.  In a 
time of conflict over access to privately-owned dry sand, it makes 
sense to ensure that the public beaches are fully accessible.  But 
these provisions do not address the conflict that HB 631 fueled. 
Section 2 of the Order explicitly addresses two state agencies with 
managerial responsibility for state-owned public beaches and directs 
them to ensure public access is not restricted.  Sections 3 and 4, 
implicitly acknowledging the limits of the Governor’s power, are 
limited in an additional way; they are merely hortatory.  
Respectively, they exhort other governmental entities, including 
local governments, not to adopt rules restricting access to public 
beaches (Section 3), and urge State Attorneys to take appropriate 
steps to ensure public access to public beaches is not infringed 
(Section 4).    
 
 Thus, the Governor’s executive action bolstered and 
confirmed the commitment to protection of public access to public 
beaches but had limited, if any, impact on the heart of the conflict: 
public access to privately-owned dry sand beach. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF HB 631/FLA. STAT. 163.035 
A. An Annotated Summary of Fla. Stat. §163.035 
The law that has precipitated much of the uncertainty over 
public use of privately-owned dry sand beaches is now codified in 
the Florida Statutes as Fla. Stat. §163.035. This section provides a 
section-by-section summary of the statute and offers comments 
concerning legal issues surrounding the bill. 
The statute’s central command is addressed to 
“governmental entities”, a term defined in subsection 1 of the statute 
to encompass state agencies and regional and local governments, 
including counties and municipalities.  Subsection 2 of the statute 
provides that these entities “may not adopt or keep in effect an 
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ordinance or rule that finds, determines, relies on, or is based upon 
customary use” of the dry sand beach unless it is based on “a judicial 
declaration affirming recreational customary use” on the beach in 
question.   
This language creates ambiguity and seems to be 
inconsistent with subsection 3(b)(2) of the statute.  The prohibition 
on adopting an ordinance or rule would seem to prohibit a 
governmental entity from taking action to adopt an ordinance after 
the statute’s effective date of July 1, 2018.  However, the added 
prohibition on keeping in effect a rule or ordinance in effect would 
only seem to have independent meaning if it required governmental 
entities with existing ordinances to repeal them.  Yet, subsection 
3(b)(2) specifically grandfathers in all ordinances in effect before 
January 1, 2016, and authorizes governmental entities to raise 
customary use as an affirmative defense in any proceeding 
challenging an ordinance or rule adopted any time before the 
statute’s effective date.  This seems to authorize governmental 
entities with ordinances adopted between January 1, 2016 and July 
1, 2018 to keep their ordinances in effect by providing them the 
opportunity to defend them if challenged in court.  This sends 
conflicting messages about whether the legislature sought to 
sanction local governments adopting ordinances before July 1, 2018. 
Subsection 3 provides that a governmental entity seeking to 
affirm the existence of recreational customary use must follow a 
new procedure that entails both legislative and judicial components, 
further defined in that subsection.  The new step in the legislative 
process outlined in subsection 3(a) requires that the governing board 
of the governmental entity first “must, at a public hearing, adopt a 
notice of intent to affirm the existence of a recreational customary 
use on private property.”132  This notice of intent must specify the 
specific parcels or portions of parcels to be included, the “detailed, 
specific, and individual uses”, and “each source of evidence” the 
governmental entity plans to rely on to prove a recreational 
 
132 FLA. STAT. §163.035(3)(a) (2018).   
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customary use has been “ancient, reasonable, without interruption, 
and free from dispute.”  
It is unclear what meaning should be given to the modifier 
“individual” in reference to uses.  It could mean only that each use 
must be identified individually, in keeping with the modifiers 
“detailed and specific”.   The language relating to the proof of 
customary use is drawn directly from the Florida Supreme Court’s 
opinion in the Tona-Rama case, and embodies the common law 
standard articulated and applied in that case to find customary use 
of Daytona Beach’s dry sand beaches. 
Subsection 3 also requires that prior to the public hearing at 
which the governmental entity adopts its notice of intent, it must 
“provide notice” of the hearing to the owner of each affected parcel 
at the address reflected in the county property appraiser’s records no 
later than 30 days before the hearing.  In addition to sending the 
notice by certified mail, the entity must publish it in a newspaper of 
general circulation and post the notice on the entity’s website. 
Subsection (3)(b) outlines the judicial portion of the newly 
created process for obtaining a declaration of recreational customary 
use.  The governmental entity must file a “Complaint for 
Declaration of Recreational Customary Use” within sixty days of 
the adoption of the notice of intent outlined in subsection 3(a).  The 
entity must provide notice of the filing of the complaint to the 
owners of affected parcels in the same manner required in 
subsection 3(a), and then must provide the court with verification of 
service of the notice on the property owners required by the statute’s 
terms. In light of the reference to service in the same manner 
required by subsection 3(a), this appears to mean service by certified 
mail rather than any other legal form of service of process. 
Subsection 3(b)(1) provides that the notice must “allow” the 
owner receiving the notice to intervene in the judicial proceeding 
within 45 days after receiving the notice. It is unclear how the notice 
itself would actually grant the owner the right to intervene.  It seems 
likely that this means that the notice must inform the owner of the 
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right to intervene created by the statute within 45 days of receipt. 
Subsection 3(b)(2) specifically provides owners of parcels of 
property subject to the complaint the right to intervene as party 
defendants in the proceeding. 
Subsection 3(b)(2) prescribes that the judicial proceeding 
shall be de novo, and that “[t]he court must determine whether the 
evidence presented demonstrates that the recreational customary use 
for the use or uses identified in the notice of intent have been 
ancient, reasonable, without interruption, and free from dispute.” It 
also provides that there is no presumption regarding the existence of 
a recreational customary use and that the governmental entity has 
the burden of proof.  Subsection 3(b)(2) grants owners of parcels of 
property subject to the complaint the right to intervene as party 
defendants. 
The final substantive provision of the statute, subsection 4, 
grandfathers in ordinances or rules adopted and in effect on or before 
January 1, 2016.  The effect of this date is to preserve the validity of 
the ordinances adopted by Volusia County and the St. Johns County 
while invalidating the Walton County ordinance, conflict over 
which seems to have been the motivating force behind the 
legislation. It also provides that the statute “does not deprive a 
governmental entity from raising customary use as an affirmative 
defense in any proceeding challenging an ordinance or rule adopted 
before July 1, 2018.”  Section 14 of HB 631 set July 1, 2018, as the 
statute’s effective date. As noted above, this provision authorizing 
customary use to serve as a defense of ordinances adopted up until 
July 1, 2018, appears to stand in some conflict with the language of 
subsection 2, which prohibits a governmental entity from “keep[ing] 
in effect” a rule or ordinance that finds, determines, relies on or is 
based upon customary use unless the ordinance is based on a judicial 
declaration.  But if a governmental entity successfully defends an 
ordinance based on customary use, presumably the ordinance is 
valid, and the entity can keep it in effect. One possible reading that 
reconciles the two provisions is that the governmental entity might 
arguably be in violation of the statute by “keeping in effect” the 
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ordinance adopted between January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2018. 
However, if the entity successfully defends the ordinance based on 
customary use, the ordinance is then based on a judicial declaration 
of the existence of customary use and no longer in violation of 
subsection 1, even though the governmental entity has not followed 
the new process outlined in subsection 3.   
B. Additional Unanswered Questions Raised by Fla. Stat. 
163.035 
 
In addition to the issues noted in the analysis above, the 
unique judicial proceeding outlined in subsection 3(b) raises a 
number of significant questions.  The parameters of the proceeding 
that are defined include: 
• How and to whom notice of the complaint must be given; 
• The de novo nature of the proceeding; 
• The issue to be determined by the court and the legal 
standard to be applied;  
• The allocation of the burden of proof; and 
The right of owners of property subject to the complaint to 
intervene. 
Questions the statute does not address and which courts will 
need to decide include: 
• The standard of proof to be applied in the proceeding for a 
judicial declaration; 
• Whether the court should make a parcel-by-parcel 
determination or a ruling on all parcels regarding the 
existence of customary use; 
• Whether the governmental entity seeking the declaration has 
authority to withdraw parcels to which it has issued a notice 
of intent, in order to avoid challenge; 
• If the governmental entity can withdraw a parcel, whether it 
thereby concedes any customary use rights the public may 
have on a given parcel;  
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• Whether members of the public or their advocates have the 
right to intervene in a proceeding, and whether they must 
establish special injury; 
• Whether landowners who intervene in the judicial 
proceeding can raise any issues beyond the existence of 
customary use; 
• Whether the judicial declaration is immediately appealable 
or whether appeal is available only from the final ordinance 
or rule adopted by the governmental entity; 
• Whether landowners who have intervened can thereafter 
raise the same issue (the existence of adequate evidence to 
prove customary use) on judicial review of the ordinance or 
rule ultimately adopted by the governmental entity; and, if 
so, whether they are restricted to raising the issue as to their 
own parcel; and 
Whether landowners who have not intervened in the proceeding 
seeking a judicial declaration can raise the issue of the adequacy of 
the evidence to support customary use on judicial review of the 
ordinance or rule ultimately adopted by the governmental entity. 
 
VI. OPTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
 
A wide array of voices have called for the repeal of Fla. Stat. 
§163.035 since its enactment.  The law cast a spotlight on beach 
access, but one that has shed distorted light, and resulted in 
widespread misunderstanding of the state of the law (both pre- and 
post-statute law) by beachfront property owners and members of the 
public.  Indeed, Exhibit A in any customary use claim might be the 
outrage and disbelief expressed by members of the beachgoing 
public in the wake of the statute, which suggest how many members 
of the public believed they had an existing right to use the dry sand 
beach. Although the law was touted by its sponsors as a tool to 
resolve conflict and reduce litigation, it seems clear, at least to date, 
that it has not achieved these goals.133 Indeed, it appears to have 
 
133 See,e.g.,  Blessey v. Walton Cnty, No. 3:18-cv-01415-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. 
(Nov. 7, 2018)(Order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
complaint seeking a declaration that customary use was unconstitutional which 
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awakened a sleeping giant, albeit in part as a result of false narratives 
about the law’s privatizing effect.   
 
In an ironic twist, the actions by landowners emboldened by the 
enactment of the law claiming new-found rights to exclude the 
public, have now given truth to the false narratives.  Although 
perhaps unintended by many legislators who supported and even 
sponsored the Bill, an indirect effect of the law’s enactment has been 
not just to create conflict, but to threaten the ability of the public to 
continue uses of beaches located around the state which may or may 
not be longstanding customary uses.134  Thus, although the statute 
itself did not measurably shift the balance between public and 
private rights, it has prompted claims and actions by private 
landowners that do threaten public rights.  The Governor’s issuance 
of the Executive Order, while not affecting rights on privately-
owned beaches, represented a clear acknowledgement of this threat 
and the need to take steps to ensure public rights are protected. 
 
Given the importance of the issues at stake—public beach 
access and private property owners’ rights—and the broad and 
important recreational, economic, property, and dignity interests 
involved, consideration of further legislative action seems 
warranted. This section outlines three options and describes some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of each.  These options include 
maintaining the status quo and letting the statute play itself out, 
repealing the statute and returning to the status quo that existed prior 
to the statute, and repealing and/or amending the statute, including 
some suggestions for policies to incorporate in a revised statute that 
enhance lateral beach access without resort to the customary use 
 
was filed after County ordinance was invalidated and before County had begun 
process under statute to adopt a new ordinance,); see also Tom McLaughlin, 
Two Property Owners Escalate Walton Customary Use Debate, 
NWFDAILYNEWS.COM (July 8, 2019) 
https://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20190708/two-property-owners-escalate-
walton-customary-use-debate. 
134 See Blanks, supra n. 91; Kimberly Miller, Palm Beach County Residents 
Fear Beach Access Will Be Cut Off After New Law, MY PALM BEACH POST Jul 
19, 2018, https://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/weather/residents-fear-beach-
access-will-cut-off-after-new-law/ZRinNeLg2DfsXjP3OF5D8K/, 
[https://perma.cc/3U5S-JVBQ]. 
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doctrine.  Elements within these options, such as providing property 
tax relief to beachfront property owners who do not contest 
recreational use, and recreational use exactions in coastal 
construction control line permitting, are not mutually exclusive. 
 
1.  Maintain the status quo and allow the statute play out over 
time 
 
A first option is to take no further legislative action.  It is 
possible that over time legal challenges resulting from the statute’s 
application could produce judicial decisions that clarify the true 
impact of the statute and eliminate or reduce conflict and confusion.  
 
One scenario that could produce such a ruling would be a 
landowner might sue local law enforcement for failing to eject 
beachgoers from their property, (wrongly) claiming rights to do so 
under the statute. However, this type of claim seems likely to fail 
without necessarily producing a definitive interpretation of the 
statute because of the considerable discretion afforded to 
government agencies in enforcement decisions.135  Failure to enforce 
claims are extremely difficult to prosecute.  
 
Also, some jurisdictions, including Walton County, have 
begun proceedings under HB 631’s new process for enactment of an 
ordinance.  Before changing the law further, the legislature should 
monitor and assess carefully, potential adverse impacts and costs to 
local governments like Walton County that have sought to follow 
the legislature’s guidance. 
 
However, an argument against doing nothing is that the 
status quo under HB 631 exacerbates an imbalance that existed 
before the statute’s enactment.  The power to enact local ordinances 
rests with local elected bodies, and the statute appears to confer the 
ability to intervene in customary use judicial determination 
proceedings on beachfront property owners only.  Except to the 
 
135 State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986) (holding that under Florida's 
constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, 
and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to 
prosecute.). 
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extent that the interests of beachgoers and advocates of beach access 
align with and are represented parens patriae by the local 
government, their interests appear to be excluded.  The statute thus 
exacerbates the imbalance already created by application of the 
special injury rule in this context, which remains a significant hurdle 
for this constituency. As noted above, the right of the public to 
intervene in the judicial proceeding under the new law remains 
unclear and untested.136  
 
Importantly, the statute does not expressly preempt the 
common law, it only affects the process that local governments who 
choose to adopt an ordinance must use to give effect to the common 
law.  As a result, it would appear that affirmative cases seeking to 
establish customary use can continue to be brought by non-
governmental parties with standing do so, such as beach-tourism 
dependent businesses, for example, even if a local government has 
not sought to codify customary use pursuant to the statute.  It is also 
possible that individuals or entities adversely affected by property 
owners’ actions could overcome the special injury rule and 
successfully challenge a local government’s actions in ejecting 
beachgoers from the dry sand beach.  Or, as in Tona-Rama, a 
business interest might challenge one or more other private 
landowners’ actions based on customary use rights of the public.   
 
The no-action option described above has the advantage 
perhaps of creating no additional confusion by further legislative 
action.  But it does little to address the ongoing widespread public 
confusion about beach access rights and the recent surge in actions 
by property owners to exclude the public.  Whether this option is the 
best one available depends on a variety of factors, including the 
costs associated with ongoing conflict—from impacts on public 
rights and on beach tourism. 
 
 
136 Even if members of the public are ultimately excluded from the judicial 
process by which customary use rights are determined under the new statute, it 
may be that creative litigants could find and assert distinct customary uses of the 
beach not covered by the ordinance.  If these use rights were not covered by the 
ordinance or determined by the court, their existence might remain a litigable 
issue, provided the party could overcome the special injury rule. 
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2.  Repeal (revert to common law) 
 
A second option is to repeal Fla. Stat. §163.035.  The impact 
of a repeal would be yet another reset.  One reason for repealing the 
statute would be to eliminate the confusion it has created. A repeal 
without further action, however, seems likely to produce conflicting 
and confusing counter-narratives; narratives opposite to those 
narratives generated by the statute.  These would likely be infected 
by the same distorted understanding of the statute.  Property owners 
who have wrongly claimed that the statute granted them new rights 
would likely claim that the repeal deprived them of those same 
asserted rights.  And some members of the public might wrongly 
believe that the repeal gave them rights beyond those afforded by 
common law and existing statutes and ordinances.   
 
As is noted above, a central legal argument advanced as a 
justification for the statute is that legislative bodies should not 
recognize or rely on findings of customary use in ordinances or rules 
unless a court has already determined that customary use exists. 
Supporters of the statute have characterized ordinances that 
recognize customary use as “usurping a judicial function.” This 
claim was rejected by the District Court in Alford.  However, if this 
was the correct view, then an existing or post-repeal ordinance 
adopted without a judicial determination could be viewed as legally 
invalid.   
 
As a practical matter, however, there is still a clear remedy 
for this: the ordinance can be challenged.  It could be argued that 
this is inadequate because the effect of allowing governmental 
entities to adopt these ordinances would be to shift the burden to 
landowners to seek judicial review of the ordinance. However, this 
seems a weak argument for legislative intervention, given that resort 
to judicial review is the typical remedy for invalid actions by 
governmental entities. It is unclear what threat to the judicial system 
is posed by allowing this issue to be resolved, first, as a legislative 
matter, and then reviewed by a court on judicial review of an 
ordinance.  Moreover, should a court determine that a governmental 
entity’s rule or ordinance is a usurpation of the judicial function, 
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then governmental entities will be on notice and can act in 
accordance with this knowledge.  
 
The strongest argument against repeal and in favor of 
requiring local governments to follow the new procedures imposed 
by HB 631 is a corollary to and depends on the validity of the claim 
that enactment of customary use ordinances is outside the authority 
of local governments.  This argument in favor of the statute is that 
if local governments cannot adopt ordinances relying on or 
establishing customary use without a prior judicial determination, 
then governmental entities have no viable process for seeking 
proactively to resolve conflict over customary use. The only 
available judicial means for the government to seek a declaratory 
judgment would be to file a complaint naming the owners of all 
affected parcels as defendants.  Both from a political and a practical 
standpoint, this is unworkable.  First, it imposes potentially 
significant costs on the landowners, regardless of whether they 
object to public use or not.  Second, elected officials are highly 
unlikely to want to sue their constituents in order to resolve this 
conflict. Thus, the argument in favor of the statute is that it creates 
a judicial process that is not a lawsuit against the landowners, but a 
proceeding more like a bond validation proceeding—a judicial 
proceeding in which the landowners have the option to intervene, 
but one in which they are not involuntarily named as defendants.  
 
However, this argument in favor of keeping the statute 
remains seriously flawed.  As is noted above, there is no apparent 
reason why the legislature needed to preempt the courts from 
determining the underlying legal issue of whether adoption of such 
an ordinance is appropriate.137  This strengthens the argument for 
repealing the statute, a move that would leave the question of the 
propriety of governmental entities adopting customary use 
ordinances for the courts to determine.   
 
137 One might even argue that the legislature is usurping a judicial function by 
trying to preclude judicial resolution of this separation of powers question – a 
question of constitutional interpretation and therefore one that clearly should be 
ultimately determined by the courts.  The statute, by precluding local 
governments from adopting an ordinance, would likely preclude a court from 
ever determining the validity of this claimed constitutional problem.   
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Repeal alone would offer some other advantages.  By 
eliminating the newly created judicial process for seeking a 
declaration of customary use, it would remove the attendant 
possibility that this new process has actually multiplied the 
opportunities for litigation and the issues to be litigated related to 
customary use, rather than reducing the multiplicity of litigation. 
However, a countervailing concern is that several local governments 
have begun proceedings under the new statute.  Thus, repeal alone 
would likely generate its own wave of confusion regarding the status 
of any ordinances adopted, or in the process of being adopted, under 
the statute.  This leads to the third option: to amend or repeal and 
replace Fla. Stat. §163.035. 
   
3.  Amend or Repeal and Replace 
 
Customary use of privately-owned beaches has moved from 
the shadows to the front pages and has become a topic of widespread 
public attention and interest.  The history in Walton County 
demonstrates that relying on the common law as a vehicle for 
resolving conflicts over customary use, or for determining whether 
customary use exists, has numerous drawbacks.  As noted above, 
these include legal, practical, and political obstacles to local 
governments or members of the public who seek to obtain a judicial 
determination of customary use rights. The resulting void generated 
conflict, resulting in the legislation that has compounded that 
conflict.   
 
Repealing or substantially amending the statute could 
remove the new hurdles the statute creates for governmental entities 
enacting ordinances or rules based on customary use and eliminate 
any litigation over interpretive issues created by the statute. This 
would leave local governments with fewer obstacles to enacting 
ordinances or rules meant to resolve conflict. However, conflict is 
not likely to dissipate with repeal of Fla. Stat. §163.035 alone.  In 
Walton County at least, it seems clear that some beachfront property 
owners and property rights advocates are committed to challenging 
the legality of the customary use doctrine as a background principle 
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of the common law in Florida. Thus, some additional legislative 
guidance may be warranted. 
 
An amended or substitute statute could retain any aspects of 
the law the benefits of which outweigh their disadvantages.  For 
example, to respect the interests of those government entities that 
have begun judicial proceedings for declarations of customary use, 
the legislature could retain the newly created judicial process, but 
make it an optional avenue for local governments that want to ensure 
they have judicial confirmation of the bounds of customary use in 
their jurisdiction before they enact an ordinance.  For those local 
governments for which this is a wiser path, the process would be 
available.  For those that have sufficient confidence in the contours 
of customary use and the public support for its codification, this 
process would no longer be necessary.  This would also moot any 
legal issues regarding the status of ordinances enacted in the window 
between the statute’s enactment and July 1, 2018; thus, eliminating 
another source of potential conflict. 
 
The prospect of amendment raises the question of whether 
there are further steps outside the footprint of the current law that 
the legislature could take to reduce conflict over privately-owned 
dry sand beach, regardless of whether the area is subject to 
customary use by the beach-going public.  There are several areas 
of law and policy related to the balance of rights and duties of 
landowners and the public that are additional sources of contention 
which may aggravate or promote conflict over dry sand beach 
access. It is worth considering whether legislative measures 
addressing these issues might provide levers that help to alleviate 
conflict and promote a fairer, more consistent set of practices 
regarding beach access statewide. The suggestions provided below 
will require further research and analysis, both as a matter of law 
and public policy, but they offer starting points for consideration of 
the contours of further legislative action. 
 
Property Tax Incentives.  Tax policy is a widely recognized tool 
available to guide behavior and promote public policy.  In this 
context, local property taxation is the most significant point of 
intersection with the dry sand beach.  A factor discussed by the 
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Florida Supreme Court in Tona-Rama and an argument raised by 
landowners who seek to restrict or oppose customary use currently, 
is the fact that the owners pay taxes on the dry sand beach being 
used by the public,138 while under the customary use doctrine their 
property rights are being restricted in a way most landowners do not 
experience.     
  
Although methods vary, some local jurisdictions already 
relieve the tax burden of beachfront for dry sand beach that is used 
by the public.139  Some counties do not assess property for tax 
purposes on this portion of the property at all,140 and others reduce 
the valuation of the property or assess it at a reduced percentage to 
account for the regulatory constraints on development of the dry 
sand beach. The legislature could explicitly recognize landowners 
who allow public access by directing property appraisers to take this 
into consideration.  In fact, this could be a default policy, and only 
when a property owner both possesses and asserts a valid right to 
exclude the public would the property be taxed at the value that 
recognizes the asserted exclusionary right. 
 
Land Acquisition Programs.  Florida is known for its robust 
history of land acquisition for conservation, including recreation, 
although this history is not without its own recent controversies.141 
 
138 This was a factor noted by the Florida Supreme Court in its Tona-Rama 
decision as well as by Justice Boyd in his dissent in that case. City of Daytona 
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75, 80 (Fla. 1974) (5-2 decision) 
(Boyd, J., dissenting). It has also been raised by plaintiffs in at least one of the 
cases challenging Walton County’s ordinance. Second Amended Complaint at 
31, Seaside Town Council v. Walton Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00682-MCR-CJK (N.D. 
Fla. Aug. 22, 2018). 
139 The authors conducted an informal telephonic survey of coastal county 
property appraisers.  Approaches to assessment and taxation of dry sand beach 
appear to vary widely and are not always clearly documented. However, it 
seems clear that property appraisers exercise considerable discretion as to 
whether and how the dry sand beach is considered in assessing property taxes. 
140 Flagler County, in its post-HB 631 proposed Customary Use Ordinance 
asserts as an “additional finding” that: “The Flagler County Property Appraiser 
does not assess the Dry Sand Beach portion of parcels along the coastline for the 
purposes of ad valorem taxation, whether owned by the property owner or not.”  
141 A 2014 voter approved constitutional amendment has been the subject of 
extensive litigation over the State’s use of the funds for what the plaintiffs argue 
are illegitimate uses such as general departmental administration. Fla. Defenders 
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Another means to ensure beach access is to acquire recreational 
access easements over the dry sand beach.  Easements are a 
remarkably flexible tool and can be tailored to include the regulatory 
and beach management requirements of local governments. Priority 
could be given to extending the recreational reach of existing state 
and local recreation areas, and in proximity to dune crossovers that 
provide beach access.  Recreational access easements could 
incorporate other conservation values such as the protection of sea 
turtle and shore bird nesting habitats.142    
 
Additionally, funds generated under the 2014 Land 
Acquisition Amendment to the Florida Constitution can likely be 
used for beach nourishment projects (as a form of “restoration”). 
Such projects create new publicly owned dry sand and provide 
public access to that sand.  These funds could also be used to acquire 
the dry sand beach above the erosion control line in fee, or through 
less than fee arrangements, either in conjunction with nourishment 
projects or on their own.   
 
However, both Florida and federal law constrain the use of 
public funds if proposed  nourishment projects do not include 
adequate perpendicular access to the nourished beach, based on the 
public policy determination that state and federal dollars should not 
be spent nourishing beaches that the public cannot reach.143  
Although likely to be controversial, this policy could be revisited to 
allow nourishment on beaches that do not qualify due to the lack of 
perpendicular access, by further conditioning nourishment on the 
 
of the Env’t, Inc. v. Detzner, Nos. 2015-CA-002682, 2015-CA-001423, 2018 
WL 3519257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 28, 2018). 
142 See Jen Lomberk et al., Less-Than-Fee Beachfront Acquisition Strategies to 
Protect and Enhance Sea Turtle Nesting Habitat in Florida (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.law.ufl.edu/law/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Less-Than-Fee-Sea-
Turtle-White-Paper-10.19.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TL6-JYMM]. 
. 
143 33 U.S.C. § 426g (2018); FLA. STAT. § 161.101(12) (2012); See History and 
Evolution of Laws Relating to Beach Nourishment, NOAA COASTAL SERVICES 
CENTER, 3-4 (2007), http://hamcamp.net/BeachNourishmentRev.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/ME3D-RVFH]. (“Federal interest in a beach nourishment 
program is conditioned by: the public ownership of land or facilities adjacent to 
the beach (or private ownership as long as public access and use is provided 
along with adequate parking”)). 
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provision of access between the dunes and the erosion control line, 
an area that would otherwise remain in private ownership following 
a nourishment project.    
 
Revocable Licenses and Management Agreements. In addition to 
real property transfers, consideration could be given to creating a 
statutory framework for the use of revocable licenses as a property-
based instrument to promote public beach access.  Florida already 
encourages these arrangements where landowners open up their 
property to recreational uses such as hunting, fishing, and hiking by 
providing liability protection to private property owners and 
eliminating the duty of care under the tort law of premises 
liability.144 These liability protections can be further augmented or 
even assumed by the state or local government through contract-
based management agreements, which can also define the scope of 
recreational use. As noted above, property tax relief could provide 
an added incentive. 
 
Shoreline Protection Exactions.  Another issue that has and will 
increasingly generate conflict over public beach access is the pace 
of erosion. Shoreline hardening is a prevalent response by 
landowners, and the percentage of shoreline that has been hardened, 
or is eligible to be hardened will only increase with time. Although 
structures such as seawalls, revetments, and geotextile tubes may 
successfully protect a structure for some period of time, shoreline 
hardening can exacerbate erosion both in front of structures and on 
adjacent properties. Over time, this can have the effect of 
eliminating the entirety of the dry sand beach, and potentially 
diminishing or eliminating even the wet sand beach, an area subject 
to the protections of the public trust doctrine.145 Compounded by 
oftentimes intense political pressure, current legislation and rules 
make it possible for beachfront landowners to obtain a permit to 
armor their beachfront; even a permit that permits armoring in the 
future. 146 Florida law currently addresses impediments to lateral 
 
144 FLA. STAT. § 375.251. 
145 See Carly Grimm et al., Feeling the Squeeze: The Troubled Future of Lateral 
Beach Access In Florida, 35 ENVTL. & LAND USE L. SEC. REP. 1, 1, 1-23 (2014). 
146 Thomas K. Ruppert, Eroding Prospects for Florida’s Beaches: Florida’s 
Coastal Construction Control Line Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. AND POL’Y J. 65, 
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beach access in coastal construction permitting and authorizes the 
DEP to require access as a condition of the permit.147 However, this 
requirement applies only to the extent there is interference with 
existing access at the time the permit is granted, and it is limited to 
the width of the interference.148  
 
While permitting seawalls to protect property may make 
sense to a property owner in the nearer-term, the long-term 
prospects are less clear. Under current projections for sea-level rise, 
many structures currently located on the oceanfront will likely be 
undermined, and eventually destroyed or abandoned. The question 
is when, not whether. The costs of a short-term strategy of shoreline 
hardening (in the absence of beach nourishment) include the likely 
eventual loss of dry sand beach and any customary use rights that 
may have existed on that beach. Thus, it may be appropriate for the 
legislature to revisit the relationship between coastal construction 
permitting and public lateral beach access. Permits for seawalls and 
other construction activities seaward of the Coastal Construction 
Control Line could be conditioned on the provision of the public 
right to access the privately-owned dry sand beach that lies in front 
of the permitted construction, subject to reasonable local regulation. 
Such a condition would certainly be considered an “exaction” under 
federal and Florida law,149and would be subject to, and tested by the 
United States Supreme Court’s essential nexus,150 and rough 
proportionality tests.151      
 
Dune restoration is a preferred alternative to shoreline 
hardening and some local governments have provided resources to 
 
84–95(2009) (outlining problems with Florida’s coastal construction and 
permitting programs). 
147 FLA. STAT. §161.053(4)(e); see Grimm et al., supra note 132.  
148 FLA. STAT. §161.053(4)(e).  
149 See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987). 
(Requiring landowner to grant an easement for lateral public access along 
shoreline as a condition of granting a building permit constitutes an exaction 
subject to the Takings Clause). Florida adopts federal law on the Takings Clause 
in interpreting the analogous clause in its state Constitution. See St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1222 (2011) rev’d on other 
grounds 570 U.S. 595 (2013). 
150 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 837.  
151 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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beachfront property owners to restore dunes in order to relieve 
pressure to install hardened shorelines in an emergency situation 
where failing dunes would compromise structures, even though no 
public recreational benefit is conferred (a requirement for federal 
and state nourishment projects).152  In such cases, public assistance 
with dune restoration on privately owned beaches could be 
conditioned on recognition of customary use rights, or a property 
interest in recreational access could be conveyed in recognition of 
that assistance.    
 
Right to Portage. Seawalls and other hardening techniques already 
create barriers to even wet sand access along Florida’s beaches.  
There are examples throughout the state where the Atlantic Ocean 
or Gulf of Mexico consistently lap at the base of shoreline armoring, 
at least for some portion of the tidal cycle. In such cases, the public 
is deprived of access to even a wet sand beach to move from one 
public beach to another, having to brave the shore break instead.  
The legislature or the courts could recognize in the public a “right 
to portage”: the right to limited trespass in order to go on, over, or 
around an obstruction—in this case a seawall or other form of 
armoring.  There is both common law and statutory precedent in 
other states for this right in streambeds, and the analogy should hold 
for navigation along the foreshore, to the next available beach.153 
 
 
152 This dilemma is nowhere better observed than in the herculean efforts of 
Flagler County to restore its beach-dune system, irrespective of ownership, in 
the aftermath of Hurricanes Matthew and Irma, and described in the finding of 
facts included in its post-HB 631 customary use ordinance.   Flagler County 
Board of County Commissioners, Public Hearing on Consideration of an 
Ordinance Recognizing the Right of Customary Use of the Beach by the Public 
(June 18, 2018). Indeed, Flagler Beach was forced to resort to local funding 
precisely because it could not demonstrate to FEMA that there was adequate 
beach access to allow for the expenditure of public funding. 
153 Under the heading “Right to portage—establishment of portage route”, 
MONT. CODE §23-2-311 (1) provides:  “A member of the public making 
recreational use of surface waters may, above the ordinary high-water mark, 
portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible, avoiding damage 
to the landowner's land and violation of the landowner's rights.”; see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 193 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The 
privilege of navigation carries with it the ancillary privilege to enter on riparian 
land to the extent that this is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of 
the principal privilege.”). 
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A.  Voluntary Approach to Advance Judicial Determination 
That Includes Non-Governmental Parties.   
 
Another issue related to customary use rights that legislative 
reform could address are the obstacles to obtaining clarity about the 
existence of customary use rights in a given location under the 
common law, something the current statute partially sought to 
address.  This includes the difficulty that both members of the public 
and local governments confront in seeking a judicial determination 
of the scope of customary use rights.  For members of the public, 
the obstacle is the special injury rule. which is not addressed in the 
statute.  For local governments, the obstacle is the need to sue 
relevant landowners in order to establish customary use, a problem 
addressed by the creation of the new judicial process.  
 
One option for reform that would alleviate the obstacles to 
resolution of conflict would draw on the contours of the mandatory 
judicial procedure outlined in Florida Statute §163.035. As is noted 
above, amended legislation could incorporate a new voluntary 
judicial process.  Going beyond this, it could provide a mechanism 
not just for local governments, but also for members of the public to 
seek a determination of the existence of customary use rights.  This 
procedure could follow the general parameters of Florida Statute 
§163.035(3)(b), but also establish a right of action for members of 
the public.  As long as the special injury rule established by the 
Florida Supreme Court is not a constitutional requirement, but 
merely a procedural rule, the legislature has the power to modify its 
application in this context. This would level the playing field.  As is 
noted above, landowners have opportunities to seek a judicial 
determination, but members of the public are constrained by the 
special injury rule.   
 
As a practical matter, such a provision is not likely to open 
the floodgates to litigation.  Preparation of the evidence needed to 
support a claim of customary use is not a simple or necessarily 
inexpensive undertaking.  But motivated members of the public or 
advocates for public beach access could seek to assert these rights 
where conflict existed. 
 
62 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
HB 631 converted local dustups between beachgoers and 
beachfront landowners into a statewide sandstorm that pitted public 
access to the dry sand beach against landowners’ private property 
rights. Like detritus left after a storm, widespread but latent 
confusion about the scope of and relationship between these 
respective rights was exposed to all.  Confused and exaggerated 
narratives about the impacts of the new law added to the inherent 
lack of clarity in the underlying common law, creating widespread 
confusion and fueling ongoing conflict.   
Despite the expressed goal of the sponsors of HB 631 to 
resolve conflict, it remains unclear that they will succeed in this 
ambition.  The spate of lawsuits filed challenging Walton County’s 
ordinance—both before and after the enactment of the new law—
have been dismissed only because the new law invalidated that 
particular ordinance, or because the County had not yet successfully 
adopted a new ordinance.  But there is little reason to expect that 
landowners will not pursue many of the same claims in new 
litigation challenging any new ordinance.154   
Although the new law itself changed only the process 
governmental entities must follow in order to adopt ordinances or 
rules based on customary use, it arose out of a broader effort by 
some landowners to restrict or eliminate customary use in Florida.  
Thus, it was accurately perceived as a threat by members of the 
public and beach access advocates.  Moreover, it has shed light on a 
significant and not easily resolved set of law and policy issues.  
Customary use of Florida’s beaches has broad policy implications, 
 
154 As is noted supra Part V.b., the statute is unclear on whether other claims can 
be raised in the new judicial proceeding for declaring customary use; however, it 
seems unlikely that landowners could raise many of the claims that were at the 
heart of several of the dismissed cases, such as as-applied takings challenges, in 
the new judicial processes.  Thus, numerous individual lawsuits seem likely to 
ensue in Walton County, at least. Only if the landowners are successful in 
challenging the factual finding of customary use on their particular parcels does 
it seem likely that they will drop their efforts. See, supra note 132 (discussing 
Blessey case). 
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with significant impact on recreational, property, dignity, economic, 
and conservation values.  Moreover, in an era of ongoing sea-level 
rise, the pressures on our coastal resources and the conflicts among 
these values will only increase.   
For better or worse, this once arcane legal doctrine is now in 
the spotlight in Florida, and the contours of its application around 
Florida’s coastline will likely be shaped through a blend of 
legislative and adjudicative processes. Law and policy makers face 
considerable challenges in navigating these issues as they seek to 
implement and build on the law in this area.  This article is intended 
as a resource for law and policy makers, judges, advocates, the 
media, and the broader public.  It is the authors’ hope that it will 
provide useful information and legal analysis to assist those working 
to resolve conflict, discern the state of the law today, and shape the 
law and policy of beach access for the future.   
 
 
